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PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
INTRABRAND RESTRAINTS
Alanj Meeset
Intrabrand restraints limit the discretion of one or more sellers-usually
dealers-with respect to the disposition of a product sold under a single
brand. While most scholars believe that such contracts can help assure opti-
mal promotion of a manufacturer's products, there is disagreement about the
exact manner in which such restraints accomplish this objective. Many
scholars believe that such restraints themselves induce dealers to engage in
promotional activities desired by the manufacturer. Others believe that such
restraints merely serve as "performance bonds," which dealers will forfeit if
they fail to follow the manufacturer's precise promotional instructions. Some
scholars reject both approaches, arguing that manufacturers are in no posi-
tion to "plan" dealers' promotional agendas and that manufacturers could
in any event rely upon less restrictive means to achieve the same objectives.
These scholars argue that these restraints are generally anticompetitive.
This Article argues that reliance upon the theory of property rights pro-
vides the most plausible account of these agreements. For one thing, a focus
on property rights helps explain why manufacturers choose to rely upon the
market to distribute their products in the first place, a decision that other
scholars have taken for granted. A manufacturer or joint venture that relied
upon its own employees to distribute its product would incur significant costs
gathering and processing the information required to direct employee activi-
ties. By relying upon the market, that is, independent dealers, firms avoid
these costs and delegate promotional decisionmaking to those actors with ac-
cess to localized knowledge and the incentives to acquire it.
Reliance on the market entails problems of its own, however. In partic-
ular, dealers may not be able to capture the benefits of local promotional
expenditures that induce consumers to purchase the manufacturer's product.
Instead, cut rate dealers may decline to expend resources on promotion, free
riding on the efforts of their fellow dealers. Thus, reliance upon independent
dealers to distribute a manufacturer's product may result in a market failure,
attenuating the benefits that decentralized distribution might otherwise pro-
duce. Intrabrand restraints help overcome this market failure and thus facil-
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itate a strategy of decentralized distribution by granting dealers an effective
property right over the promotional information they produce, thus perfecting
dealers' incentives to identify and pursue optimal promotional strategies.
Far from ensuring that dealers pursue a particular promotional agenda "de-
sired by the manufacturer," as some have argued, such restraints actually
further the strategy of decentralization by perfecting dealers' ability to pursue
whichever agenda they should choose. Moreover, because manufacturers and
joint ventures adopt such restraints to avoid planing dealers' promotional
activities, such restraints are superior to so-called less restrictive alternatives
that inevitably require manufacturers to announce and enforce detailed pro-
motional strategies. This property rights interpretation of these restraints bol-
sters the scholarly presumption in their favor and should compel courts to
analyze all such agreements under a lenient Rule of Reason.
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INTRODUCTION
Manufacturers must decide how to distribute their products to
consumers. Some firms perform this function themselves by owning
their own retail outlets and employing the salespeople who work
there. Others choose to rely upon "the market," selling their products
to independent firms who then sell the items to consumers.
Companies that choose the latter option often attempt to exer-
cise some control over those who distribute their products, employing
what economists and antitrust scholars call "intrabrand restraints."1
These contracts limit the discretion of one or more sellers-usually
dealers-with respect to the disposition of a product sold under a sin-
1 See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETI-
TION AND ITS PRACTICE § 11.1, at 441 (1999) ("These restraints are described as 'in-
trabrand,' because they regulate a dealer's sales of a single brand without creating
limitations on its sales of brands made by other suppliers.").
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gle brand.2 Such restraints may be "vertical," as when a single manu-
facturer grants its dealers exclusive territories or sets minimum resale
prices. 3 They may also be "horizontal," as when a joint venture be-
tween competitors imposes exclusive territories or resale prices on
members that distribute the venture's product.4 Such partial integra-
tion allows a manufacturer orjoint venture to assert control over firms
that sell its product without owning these entities outright.
For many decades, economists, antitrust scholars, and courts were
hostile to intrabrand restraints. According to neoclassical price the-
ory, the dominant approach to industrial organization during the
20th century, economic activity is conducted in one of two ways: the
firm or the market. Within this intellectual framework, practices that
are "between" the firm and the market, that is, that share characteris-
tics of both institutions, are inherently suspect. Price theory's hostility
to such nonstandard agreements produced the "inhospitality tradi-
tion" of antitrust, whereby courts declared partial integration unlaw-
ful per se or presumptively unlawful. 5 According to these courts,
intrabrand restraints-which controlled the disposition of products
after their sale "on the market"-offered a prime example of such
anticompetitive practices. 6
In recent decades, antitrust law and scholarship have exper-
ienced a revolution of sorts. Economists and other scholars have
sought new explanations for nonstandard agreements, including in-
trabrand restraints. Today, most economists and antitrust scholars be-
lieve that intrabrand restraints usually produce significant economic
2 Id.
3 See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 765 (1984) (rejecting
challenge to jury finding that defendant enforced minimum resale price maintenance);
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 381 (1967) (evaluating exclusive
territories and other vertical restraints), overruled in part by Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (evaluating joint
venture's imposition of exclusive territories on members that distributed its product); see
also Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593, 602-03 (7th
Cir. 1996) (examining agreement among venture members limiting output of venture
product); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 212 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (evaluating joint venture's imposition of minimum prices on members).
5 See Alan J. Meese, Price Theory, Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REv. 77, 124-26 [hereinafter Meese, Price Theory].
6 See infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text (describing price theory's model of
industrial organization and its influence on antitrust policy). Seegenerally Topco, 405 U.S. at
608 (declaring horizontal exclusive territories ancillary to legitimate joint venture unlawful
per se); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-54 (1968) (holding maximum resale
price restraints unlawful per se), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997);
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. at 382 (ruling location clauses and other vertical in-
trabrand restraints unlawful per se).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:553
benefits by facilitating the distribution of products to consumers. 7
However, this agreement is not universal. Some scholars still resist the
claim that intrabrand restraints are presumptively efficient.8 Echoing
the inhospitality tradition, these scholars continue to emphasize the
purported harms that such restraints can cause, while concurrently
doubting their supposed benefits.9
Nevertheless, the trend among academics is unmistakable: most
advocate a strong presumption that intrabrand restraints are procom-
petitive. 11 Over the past three decades, this scholarship has influ-
7 See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
290-91, 435-39, 449-50 (asserting that vertical distribution restraints produce significant
benefits and should be lawful per se); HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, § 11.7a, at 485 ("Most
price and nonprice [vertical] restraints are efficient and benefit consumers."); RICHARD A.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: A-, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 171-84 (2001); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING
185-89 (1985); id. at 28 (articulating a "rebuttable presumption that nonstandard forms of
contracting have efficiency purposes"); Victor P. Goldberg, The Free Rider Problem, Imperfect
Pricing, and the Economics of Retailing Services, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 736, 738 (1984) [hereinafter
Goldberg, Retailing Services] (suggesting there is an "embarrassment of riches" when it
comes to beneficial explanations of vertical restraints).
While most scholarly discussion focuses on vertical intrabrand restraints, similar rea-
soning led many of the same scholars to a presumption in favor of horizontal intrabrand
restraints. See, e.g., BORK, supra, at 274-79 (rejecting per se rule against horizontal in-
trabrand restraints in favor of Rule of Reason treatment); POSNER, supra, at 187-89 (same).
8 See, e.g., RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY, RHETORIC,
LAW 258 (2001) (contending that vertical intrabrand restraints generally harm consumers
because they result in "monopolistic competition-the product differentiation, the market
fragmentation through advertising and promotion, and the pursuit of brand loyalty lead-
ing to higher costs and higher prices"); LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN GRIMES, THE LAW
OF ANTITRUST: AN INTECRATED HANDBOOK 304-16 (2000) (emphasizing the harms pro-
duced by vertical intrabrand restraints); Peter C. Carstensen, The Competitive Dynamics of
Distribution Restraints: The Efficiency Hypothesis Versus The Rent-Seeking, Strategic Alternatives, 69
ANTITRUST L.J. 569 (2001) (asserting a number of nonefficiency-oriented explanations as
to why manufacturers and retailers create restraints on distribution); id. at 327-35 (sug-
gesting a "structured rule of reason" whereby proof of product differentiation suffices to
establish a presumption that such restraints are unlawful); id. at 664-67 (stating that courts
should presume horizontal intrabrand restraints unlawful); John J. Flynn, The "Is" and
"Ought" of Vertical Restraints After Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 71 CORNELL L.
REV. 1095, 1142-47 (1986) (arguing that courts should presume vertical intrabrand re-
straints unlawful); Robert Pitofsky, A FramewvorkforAntitrust Analysis ofJoint Ventures, 74 GEO.
L.J. 1605, 1620-21 (1986) [hereinafter Pitofsky, Joint Ventures] (treating horizontal in-
trabrand restraints as presumptively unlawful or unlawful per se); see also Robert Pitofsky,
Wiy Dr. Miles Was Right, 8 REG. 27 (1984) [hereinafter Pitofsky, Dr. Miles] (arguing that
minimum resale price maintenance should be unlawful per se).
9 See Carstensen, supra note 8, at 574-605; Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters:
The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1490-93
(1983) [hereinafter Pitofsky, No-Frills Case].
II One scholar recently claimed that the presumption in favor of intrabrand restraints
is "generally associated with the Chicago School" of antitrust analysis. See Carstensen, supra
note 8, at 571. While it is certainly true that members of the Chicago School pioneered the
theoretical claim that such restraints are generally efficient, several leading scholars
outside the Chicago School explicitly embrace the presumption that vertical restraints are
usually procompetitive. See, e.g., HOVENKANIP, supra note 1, § 11.3, at 450-58, 485-89; WIL-
LIAMSON, supra note 7, at 185-89.
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enced judges, and courts have adjusted antitrust doctrine to reflect
this academic trend.II However, courts still remain hostile to certain
intrabrand restraints, particularly those that explicitly invoke price or
output. 12
Despite these developments in theory and doctrine, disagree-
ment persists among proponents of intrabrand restraints about the
exact mechanism through which such agreements may reduce the
cost of distribution. The dominant approach, first articulated by Pro-
fessor Lester Telser, focuses on vertical intrabrand restraints but has
implications for horizontal arrangements as well.1 3 According to
Telser, such restraints can overcome a form of market failure that
might result when manufacturers rely upon independent dealers-
the market-to distribute their goods. 14 Left to their own devices, it is
said, individual dealers will refuse to produce certain promotional ser-
vices-information-that enhance consumer demand for the manu-
facturer's product, choosing instead to free ride on the promotional
efforts of fellow dealers.' 5 Because all dealers will find it rational to
free ride in this manner, no dealer will provide promotional services,
and demand for the manufacturer's product will fall. 16 Telser and
other scholars assert that vertical intrabrand restraints can prevent
such free riding by eliminating price competition among dealers,
thereby channeling competitive efforts into other forms of rivalry,
such as the provision of presale promotion desired by the manufac-
turer.' 7 Other scholars have extended Telser's analysis to explain vari-
ous intrabrand restraints that are horizontal in nature.' 8
11 See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 16-19 (1997) (invoking academic com-
mentary to reject per se rule against maximum resale price maintenance (maximum
rpm)); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 725-31 & nn.3-4 (1988)
(relying in part upon academic commentary to limit the scope of per se rule against mini-
mum resale price maintenance (minimum rpm)); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 55-59 (1977) (employing academic commentary to reject per se rule against
location clauses and other vertical territorial restraints).
12 See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
109-13 (1984) (holding that horizontal intrabrand restraints that increase price or reduce
output are presumptively unlawful); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752,
761-62 & n.7 (1984) (declining invitation by the Solicitor General of the United States to
reconsider per se rule against minimum rpm); see also Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S.
756, 769-70 (1999) (stating that explicit horizontal restraint on price or output establishes
prima facie case that restraint is unlawful); Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 724-27 (adhering
in dicta to per se rule against minimum rpm).
13 See Lester G. Telser, Wy Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & ECON. 86
(1960) [hereinafter Telser, Fair Trade I].
14 See id. at 90-96.
15 See id. at 91-92.
16 Id. at 91-93.
17 Id.; see, e.g., BORK, supra note 7, at 290-91, 449-50; POSNER, supra note 7, at 172-75.
18 See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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Two scholars sympathetic to intrabrand restraints-Professors
Benjamin Klein and Kevin Murphy-reject Telser's account, arguing
that such restraints cannot overcome free riding.' 9 Although Klein
and Murphy agree that dealers tend to free ride on each others' pro-
motional efforts, they correctly note that Telser fails to explain how
such restraints in fact induce dealers to engage in the promotional
activities desired by the manufacturer. 20 For their part, Klein and
Murphy argue that vertical intrabrand restraints are private mecha-
nisms for enforcing implicit contractual obligations that dealers as-
sume as a condition of distributing the manufacturer's product.2 1
More precisely, by conferring market power on dealers, intrabrand
restraints create a stream of income that dealers will forfeit if termi-
nated and thus serve as a sort of performance bond that dealers post
by agreeing to such restraints. 22 Such bonds do not themselves
prompt dealers to engage in any promotional activity. They do, how-
ever, facilitate a manufacturer's efforts to ensure dealers' compliance
with obligations to engage in promotional efforts, as well as other un-
related obligations. 23
The Telser account of intrabrand restraints is in obvious tension
with that offered by Klein and Murphy. Still, both also share some
common characteristics. First, neither questions the manufacturer's
decision not to integrate forward into distribution-that is, to rely
upon "the market" to distribute its goods.24 This approach is consis-
tent with neoclassical price theory, which took the boundaries of a
firm as determined by technology and thus given. 25 Second, both ac-
counts assume that reliance on the market can involve a cost in the
form of dealer free riding.26 Moreover, while both accounts focus on
vertical intrabrand restraints, both can readily apply to certain in-
trabrand restraints that are horizontal, explaining, for instance, why a
joint venture might assign exclusive territories to members selling its
product.2 7 Finally, and most importantly, both rest upon the price-
theoretic assumption that manufacturers know what types of services
19 See Benjamin Klein, Distribution Restrictions Operate by Creating Dealer Profits: Explain-
ing the Use of Maximum Resale Price Maintenance in State Oil v. Khan, 7 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 1,
35-38 (1999) [hereinafter Klein, Distribution Restrictions]; Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Mur-
phy, Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1988).
20 See Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 266 ("No matter how large a margin is cre-
ated by resale price maintenance, there appears to be no incentive for competitive free-
riding retailers to supply the desired demonstration services.").
21 Id. at 270-76.
22 Id. at 274-76.
23 See id.
24 See infra note 40 and accompanying text; infta note 70 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 42-47, 72 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Topco Assocs.,
Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (declaring such territories unlawful per se).
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they wish dealers to provide and that manufacturers employ in-
trabrand restraints to induce dealers to provide that desired mix and
level of services. Put another way, both approaches seem to conclude
that manufacturers employ intrabrand restraints to plan the promo-
tional activities of their dealers, much as a firm "plans" the activities of
its employees. This planning assumption renders each approach vul-
nerable to certain criticisms leveled by opponents of such restraints.
28
This Article examines an alternative framework for evaluating
and explaining intrabrand restraints, a framework derived from the
concept of property. Unlike neoclassical price theory, a property
rights approach can explain why firms rely upon the market to dis-
tribute their goods and also helps illuminate the rationale for in-
trabrand restraints. This Article argues that many vertical intrabrand
restraints may be characterized as contracts for property rights-i.e.,
rights that facilitate and perfect a manufacturer's decision to rely
upon the market to distribute its goods. More precisely, such agree-
ments may be characterized as a means of vesting dealers with exclu-
sive rights over a valuable resource, namely, customers who decide to
purchase a manufacturer's product. By perfecting dealer property
rights, manufacturers can transform promotional information from a
collective good into a private good, thus facilitating its production. 29
Similarly, a joint venture among competitors can use horizontal in-
trabrand restraints to perfect the property rights of members who dis-
tribute the venture's product. 30
Significantly, the existence and enforcement of intrabrand re-
straints does not depend upon any implicit or explicit assumption that
manufacturers possess the knowledge necessary to plan or anticipate
the promotional activities of their dealers. Whereas a planning-based
account imputes extraordinary prescience to the manufacturer, in re-
ality knowledge of optimal promotional strategies is difficult to obtain;
no single firm can readily gather and possess all such information.
Because they take for granted the availability of knowledge about opti-
mal promotional strategies, both planning accounts ignore one ratio-
nale for relying upon a dealer-based system of distribution in the first
place: the desire to decentralize authority over promotional decision-
making. By relying upon the market and vesting dealers with property
rights, it is argued, manufacturers empower dealers to determine what
sorts of promotional efforts make sense-i.e., what sorts of informa-
tion to produce. At the same time, these restraints ensure that dealers
28 See infra Part I.B.
29 See generally R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357, 372-76
(1974) [hereinafter Coase, The Lighthouse] (explaining that a good's status as public or
collective on the one hand, or private on the other, can depend upon the background
assignment of property rights).
30 See infra note 262 and accompanying text.
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who produce such information can recover the cost of doing so, thus
perfecting dealers' market-based incentives to identify and execute
optimal promotional strategies. A planning account errs by assuming
that manufacturers possess the very knowledge that reliance on the
market and intrabrand restraints help create.
To be sure, a manufacturer could maintain a form of property
rights in information by integrating forward into the distribution of its
product, relying upon salaried employees with access to knowledge
about local conditions to make its promotional decisions. In this way
the manufacturer would ensure that only a single entity internalizes
the benefits of producing information useful to consumers. However,
reliance on employees with little or no stake in promotional outcomes
deprives the manufacturer of a key aspect of a market-based system of
distribution: independent dealers who internalize the profit from
their promotional efforts. By contrast, intrabrand restraints allow
manufacturers to have the best of both worlds: dealers who possess
localized knowledge and appropriate incentives to promote the manu-
facturer's product. A manufacturer will thus avoid the shortcomings
of complete vertical integration while simultaneously realizing the full
benefits of a market-based system of distribution. Other benign ac-
counts simply do not address the role that intrabrand restraints play in
facilitating a strategy of decentralized, market-based distribution.
By rejecting the planning assumption inherent in current benign
accounts, a property rights theory offers a more plausible explanation
of how intrabrand restraints ensure that dealers engage in appropri-
ate promotional activities. As a result, the property approach ulti-
mately bolsters Telser's standard account against both friendly and
hostile critiques. A property-based account counters claims that in-
trabrand restraints cannot induce the exact promotion that the manu-
facturer desires. Such claims ignore the fact that these restraints can
facilitate a strategy of decentralized generation of knowledge about
local promotional strategies. Such a strategy of decentralization rests
on a manufacturer's rejection of any desire to obtain a particular mix of
promotional services. Moreover, a property account provides a more
robust response to the assertion that less restrictive alternatives-in-
cluding complete vertical integration-will advance the legitimate
objectives of intrabrand restraints without producing offsetting harms.
A property rights account applies with equal force to horizontal in-
trabrand restraints, explaining, for instance, a joint venture's imposi-
tion of intrabrand restraints on members that distribute its product.
In short, a property rights conception of intrabrand restraints solidi-
fies Telser's approach by supporting the presumption that such re-
straints are procompetitive. Finally, a property rights approach
suggests that courts should continue to adjust antitrust doctrine gov-
[Vol. 89:553
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erning intrabrand restraints, subjecting all such restraints to lenient
Rule of Reason treatment.
The property rights account of intrabrand restraints offered here
does not purport to explain all such contracts. Not all products re-
quire the sort of presale promotional services that Telser and others
have identified. Thus, intrabrand restraints employed in some indus-
tries require a different explanation. 31 Nonetheless, where products
do require presale promotion incident to their sale, a property rights
account provides the most plausible description of the rationale for
such restraints.
Part I of this Article canvasses the competing benign accounts of
intrabrand restraints. Both benign accounts assume that manufactur-
ers possess the knowledge necessary to plan or anticipate the promo-
tional activities of those who distribute their products, and this
assumption gives rise to various critiques by scholars hostile to in-
trabrand restraints. Part II examines a competing "property rights"
conception of such restraints that rejects the planning assumption in-
herent in the benign accounts. Part III explains how the property
rights approach ultimately bolsters Telser's analysis against various cri-
tiques and outlines the doctrinal implications of this approach.
I
COMPETING ACCOUNTS OF INTRABRAND RESTRAINTS
A. Two Benign Accounts of Intrabrand Restraints
Price theory dominated industrial organization from 1940
through the 1970s.3 2 The dominant economic paradigm of this pe-
riod-neoclassical price theory-rested on several assumptions that
produced an intellectual milieu quite hostile to such restraints. The
firm of price theory was a "black box," a production function with a
unitary interest that purchased inputs and transformed them into out-
puts. 33 Moreover, the boundary between the "firm" and "the market,"
31 See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (explaining use of restraints by beer
manufacturer without relying upon claim that such restraints induced presale promotion).
32 See R.H. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in POLICY" ISSUES AND
RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 61-64 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1972)
(arguing that, as of 1972, Industrial Organization consisted simply of applied price the-
ory); WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 7, 23-26 (describing the price-theoretic "orthodox
framework" that dominated industrial organization between 1940 and 1970); see also
GEORGEJ. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 1 (1968) (describing industrial organi-
zation as consisting of applied "price or resource allocation theory").
33 See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 3 (1988) ("The firm to an
economist... 'is effectively defined as a cost curve and a demand curve, and the theory [of
the firm] is simply the logic of optimal pricing and input combination."' (quoting Martin
Slater, Foreword to EDITH T. PENROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GROWrH OF THE FIRM, at ix (2d
ed. 1980))); Richard N. Langlois, Contract, Competition, and Efficiency, 55 BROOK. L. REv.
831, 834 (1989) [hereinafter Langlois, Contract] ("[T]he economists' firm-at least until
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that is, the distinction between what a firm produces itself and what it
leaves to others, was determined by technological considerations com-
mon to all firms in a given industry. 34 In this price-theoretic world,
it cost little or nothing to acquire or transfer information, and
firms and consumers rarely behaved in an opportunistic manner.35
Given these assumptions, there was no rationale for a manufactur-
er to control the disposition of its product after title passed to an-
other firm or consumer. 6 Price theory, in turn, gave rise to the
"inhospitality tradition of antitrust," which presumed that all non-
standard contracts, including intrabrand restraints, were efforts
to create or to exercise market power.3 7  Antitrust law generally
recently--was a black box, a production function that took in inputs and transformed
them into outputs."); Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. L.J. 271, 272
(1987) (describing the "prevailing practice [under price theory] of describing the firm as a
production function whose natural boundaries were defined by technology," and noting
that "[e]conomic inputs were thus transformed by the production technology into eco-
nomic outputs ... [and] organizational considerations [that might explain the boundaries
of firms] were effectively suppressed").
34 See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 97-98 (1948) [here-
inafter HAYEK, The Meaning of Competition, in ECONOMIC ORDER] (explaining link between
the assumption that all firms possessed the same production technology and the assump-
tion that information was costless to obtain); WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 7 ("The prevail-
ing orientation toward economic organization [under price theory] . . . was that
technological features of firm and market organization were determinative."); Richard N.
Langlois, Transaction Costs, Production Costs, and the Passage of Time, in COASFAN ECONOMICS:
LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 2-3 (Steven G. Medema ed.,
1998) [hereinafter Langlois, Transaction Costs] (" [T] he 'theory of the firm' ... start[s] with
firms as production functions, each one identical, and each one transforming homogene-
ous inputs into homogeneous outputs according to given technical 'blueprints' known to
all."); George J. Stigler, The Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the Market, 59J. POL.
ECON. 185, 185 (1951) (stating that economic theory has "generally treated as a (techno-
logical?) datum the problem of what the firm does-what governs its range of activities or
functions"); Oliver E. Williamson, Technology and Transaction Cost Economics, 10 J. EcoN.
BEHAV. & ORG. 355, 356 (1988) (asserting that under the price-theoretic paradigm, "[t]he
'natural' boundaries of the firm were thought to be defined by engineering
considerations").
35 See Langlois, Transaction Costs, supra note 34, at 2 ("In this kingdom [of the price-
theoretic paradigm], knowledge remains explicit and freely transmittable, and cognitive
limits seldom if ever constrain."); see also Meese, Price Theory, supra note 5, at 116-17 (ex-
amining price theory's tendency to assume away opportunism).
36 See Meese, Price Theory, supra note 5, at 118.
:37 See id. at 124; see also WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 370-73 (describing influence of
inhospitality tradition on antitrust treatment of nonstandard contracts). One commenta-
tor states:
[The] "inhospitality tradition" of antitrust ... called for courts to strike
down business practices that were not clearly procompetitive. In this tradi-
tion an inference of monopolization followed from the courts' inability to
grasp how a practice might be consistent with substantial competition. The
tradition took hold when many practices were genuine mysteries to econo-
mists, and monopolistic explanations of mysteries were congenial. The
same tradition emphasized competition in the spot market. Long-term
contracts, even those arrived at by competitive processes, were deemed an-
ticompetitive because they shut off day-to-day rivalry.
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tracked these insights and declared most such restraints unlawful
per se.38
In 1960, Professor Lester Telser offered a radically different ac-
count of intrabrand restraints, an account that implicitly rejected cer-
tain price-theoretic assumptions that drove the inhospitality
tradition.39 Like price theorists, Telser began with the assumption
that a manufacturer relies upon the market to distribute its prod-
ucts. 40 At the same time, Telser argued that effective distribution may
in some instances require dealers to provide consumers with "special
services," particularly information about the product's attributes,
prior to sale. 41 Unlike the underlying product, however, such infor-
mation is a "collective good"; the dealer who produces that informa-
tion cannot exclude nonpaying consumers from it.42
Contrary to the assumptions of price theory, information is not
free.43 Like the production of most collective goods, the production
of special services is potentially beset by a form of opportunism known
Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEX. L. REV. 705, 715 (1982).
Professor Donald Turner, a Harvard Law School economist and former head of the Anti-
trust Division at the Department of Justice, apparently coined the phrase "inhospitality
tradition." See Donald F. Turner, Some Reflections on Antitrust, 1966 N.Y. ST. B. A. ANTITRUST
L. SYMP. 1, 1-2 ("I approach territorial and customer restrictions not hospitably in the
common law tradition, but inhospitably in the tradition of antitrust law.").
38 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (finding
horizontal exclusive territory ancillary to a single-brand joint venture unlawful per se); Al-
brecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (declaring maximum resale price maintenance
unlawful per se), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 7 (1997); United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1968) (finding location clause and other vertical
restraints unlawful per se), overruled by Cont'l T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
57-59 (1977); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 357 (1968) (declaring horizontal
price fixing ancillary to legitimate joint venture unlawful per se); Simpson v. Union Oil
Co., 377 U.S. 13, 24 (1964) (finding consignment agreement setting price of manufac-
turer's product unlawful per se). The Court and scholars showed equal hostility to inter-
brand restraints. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966); Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949); see also Meese, Price Theory, supra note 5, at 122-28
(describing academic and judicial opposition to intrabrand and interbrand restraints).
39 See Telser, Fair Trade I, supra note 13, at 86-88, 100.
40 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (explaining that price theory took the
boundaries of the firm as a given, determined by technology).
41 See Telser, Fair Trade I, supra note 13, at 89-91.
42 Id. at 91-92; see also MANCUR OtsoN, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTrvE ACTION 13-15
(1965) (defining collective good). To be sure, there are some instances in which dealers
could recoup the cost of presale promotion directly from customers. For instance, a dealer
could charge consumers for product demonstrations. However, few consumers would be
willing to pay for such demonstrations because they would not know the value of the dem-
onstration until after they received it. See KENNETH J. ARRow, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF
RIsK-BEARING 152 (1971) ("[Information's] value for the purchaser is not known until he
has the information, but then he has in effect acquired it without cost.").
43 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (outlining price theory's assumption
that production and dissemination of information is costless).
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as "free riding. '44 A dealer who produces information cannot charge
a price to consumers who use that information. At best, the dealer
can hope that the consumer will purchase the underlying good from
it, at a price that reflects the cost of the information. 45 But if consum-
ers are rational, they will try to avoid paying for this information, even
if they choose to purchase the product in question. At the same time,
rational dealers will behave in an opportunistic manner, seeking to
attract these consumers by forgoing the production of information
and offering them the product at a price lower than that charged by
dealers who produce the information. 46 If dealers and consumers act
rationally, no dealer will produce such special services, and demand
for the manufacturer's product will fall.47
Given the tendency of dealers to free ride, reliance on the sort of
unrestricted market that price theory imagined to distribute goods
will result in market failure and suboptimal demand for the manufac-
turer's product.48  Minimum resale price maintenance ("minimum
rpm"), it is said, can cure this failure by undermining dealer and cus-
tomer efforts to free ride. 49 For instance, a contract setting a price
floor-minimum rpm-for dealers may prevent free riding dealers
from undercutting a full-service retailer.50 Indeed, Telser argued that
such an agreement will do more than prevent free riding; it will also
cause dealers to engage in various forms of nonprice competition.
Just as a cartel agreement will lead participants to "cheat" by, for in-
stance, offering ancillary services "under the table," so too will mini-
mum rpm induce dealers to "cheat" by engaging in nonprice
competition. 51 Promotional expenditures, of course, are one form of
such competition. 52  By setting a floor on the price dealers can
44 See OLSON, supra note 42, at 9-12, 26-31; see also WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 47
(defining opportunism as "self-interest seeking at the expense of trading partners with
guile").
45 See ARROW, supra note 42, at 152; WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 9 n.8.
46 See Telser, Fair Trade I, supra note 13, at 91 ("[S]ome retailers have good reason not
to provide these special services and offer to sell the product at lower prices. They reduce
their prices because they avoid the additional cost of the special services."); cf supra note
35 (explaining how price theory assumed away opportunism by dealers and others).
47 See Telser, Fair Trade I, supra note 13, at 91 ("As a result [of distributor free riding,]
few or none of the retailers offer the special services the manufacturer thinks necessary to
sell his product."); see also OLSON, supra note 42, at 27 ("Normally, the provision of the
collective good will be strikingly suboptimal."); Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers
Want Fair Trade II?, 33J.L. & ECON. 409, 409-10 (1990) [hereinafter Telser, Fair Trade II]
(stating that absent some vertical control, free riding among retailers will lead to an ineffi-
cient equilibrium in which no retailer provides special services).
48 See Meese, Price Theory, supra note 5, at 183-89.
49 Telser, Fair Trade I, supra note 13, at 91-96.
50 Id. at 90-91.
51 It should be noted that Telser did not himself invoke this analogy to a cartel; subse-
quent scholars did so. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 7, at 14-15, 172-73.
52 Telser, Fair Trade 1, supra note 13, at 91-92.
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charge, according to Telser, a manufacturer can ensure that any re-
tailer rivalry takes the form of promotional services desired by the
manufacturer.
53
While Telser's analysis focused on the possibility that minimum
rpm-a vertical restraint-can induce presale promotion like advertis-
ing and product demonstrations, other scholars have extended his
analysis to include additional promotional services that minimum rpm
can generate. 54 For instance, some scholars have argued that a manu-
facturer can employ minimum rpm to compensate fashionable retail-
ers for carrying the manufacturer's product, thus certifying to
consumers that the item is of high quality.5 5 According to these schol-
ars, minimum rpm or other intrabrand restraints can allow dealers to
recoup the expense of investigating a product's attributes before certi-
fying the product's quality to consumers by preventing cut-rate dealers
from free riding on such certifications. 56 Other scholars have applied
Telser's analysis to different vertical restraints, 57 contending that an
exclusive territory, for instance, can eliminate or attenuate the pros-
pect of dealer free riding and thus prevent the dealers who do provide
special services from suffering at the expense of those who do not.
58
Similarly, many scholars have applied Telser's analysis to horizontal
intrabrand restraints. These scholars argue that horizontal divisions
of territory or horizontal price fixing ancillary to legitimate joint ven-
53 See id. at 90-91.
54 See Goldberg, Retailing Services, supra note 7, at 738-48; Howard P. Marvel, The Re-
sale Price Maintenance Controversy: Beyond the Conventional Wisdom, 63 ANTITRUSr L.J. 59,
65-67 (1994); Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, Resale Price Maintenance and Quality
Certification, 15 RANDJ. EcoN. 346, 348 (1984) (arguing that resale price maintenance com-
pensates reputable dealers for choosing to stock a manufacturer's additional product, thus
signaling the product's quality to consumers).
55 See Goldberg, Retailing Services, supra note 7, at 744-46 (arguing that manufacturers
can employ minimum rpm to purchase a dealer's "endorsement" of its product); Marvel &
McCafferty, supra note 54, at 348.
56 See Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 54, at 347-49. It should be noted that this
"endorsement" account of intrabrand restraints does not depend upon the manufacturer's
ability to determine how dealers assess the quality of products before choosing to carry
them.
57 See Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 430-38 (1966) [hereinafter Bork, Rule of Reason] (applying
Telser's analysis to exclusive territories); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme
Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Deci-
sions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 285 (1975) (same). Indeed, even before Bork and Posner
extended Telser's analysis, litigants advanced similar arguments before the courts and the
enforcement agencies. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 13, White Motor Co. v. United States,
372 U.S. 253 (1963) (No. 54) (arguing that reservation of customers and exclusive territo-
ries were necessary to ensure that "dealers who have spent valuable time 'pre-selling' a
customer-i.e., softening him up for a White sale instead of a G.M. or Ford sale-will not
lose the legitimate reward of their labor to another White dealer who jumps territorial
boundaries ... and snatches away the pre-sold customer").
58 See Bork, Rule of Reason, supra note 57, at 430-38; Posner, supra note 57, at 283-85.
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tures can ensure appropriate promotion of the venture's product and
should be presumed lawful.59 Numerous antitrust scholars and econ-
omists employ Telser's analysis, to support assertions that intrabrand
restraints are generally procompetitive. 60  Moreover, the Supreme
Court, relying upon Telser's analysis, has directed lower courts to ex-
amine vertical intrabrand restraints that do not invoke price or output
under a "Rule of Reason" analysis. 61 On the other hand, the inhospi-
tality tradition continues to influence antitrust doctrine. In particu-
lar, intrabrand restraints that do invoke price or output are either
unlawful per se or presumptively unlawful pursuant to a truncated
Rule of Reason test. Under this test, proof of a restraint's existence
itself gives rise to a prima facie case, requiring justification by the
defendants .62
59 See BoRK, supra note 7, at 270-79; HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, § 5.2b, at 205-09 (ar-
guing that horizontal restraints truly ancillary to legitimate joint ventures should be ana-
lyzed under the Rule of Reason); Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U. Cm. L.
REv. 886, 887 (1981) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixingl (arguing for elimina-
tion of the per se rule against maximum price fixing because the practice benefits consum-
ers); Alan J. Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look: Redefining the Scope and Content of the Rule of
Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 461, 491-93 (2000) [hereinafter Meese, Quick Look] (applying
Telser's analysis to explain horizontal exclusive territories ancillary to a legitimate joint
venture); Posner, supra note 57, at 298-99 (arguing that horizontal ancillary restraints
should be lawful absent a showing of market power); see also Rothery Storage & Van Co. v.
Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.) (finding horizontal
price fixing ancillary to joint venture a reasonable restraint because it deterred free rid-
ing); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 190-91 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook,
J.) (holding that horizontal ancillary restraint might plausibly combat free riding and thus
should be analyzed under the Rule of Reason). But see United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc.,
405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (declaring division of territories ancillary to legitimate joint ven-
ture unlawful per se).
60 See, e.g., Born, supra note 7, at 288-91; POSNER, supra note 7, at 171-77, 187-88;
Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135,
148-50 (1984) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements].
61 See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723-28 (1988) (relying
upon assertion that vertical intrabrand restraints can produce significant benefits to nar-
row scope of per se rule against minimum rpm); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 55-57 (1977) (invoking similar reasoning to reject per se rule against exclusive
territories); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, § 11.6b, at 480 (concluding that Rule of
Reason applied to nonprice restraints "has come close to creating complete nonliability").
62 See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769-70 (1999) (stating that explicit
horizontal restraint on price or output establishes prima facie case that restraint is unlawful
under an abbreviated Rule of Reason analysis); Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984) (stating that horizontal restraints on
price or output are generally unlawful per se, without regard to their market context); id.
at 100-01 (declining to apply per se rule where some horizontal cooperation was necessary
to create product in the first place); id. at 110 (stating that, even under the Rule of Reason,
existence of naked restraint on price or output itself establishes a prima facie case); Mon-
santo Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 n.7 (1984) (declining to reconsider
the per se rule against minimum rpm); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S.
332, 342-57 (1982) (declaring horizontal maximum price fixing ancillary to a legitimate
joint venture unlawful per se); Chicago Prof I Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n,
961 F.2d 667, 674-76 (7th Cir. 1992) (reading NCAA as allowing plaintiff to establish a
prima facie case by proving explicit horizontal intrabrand price restraint).
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Telser's special services argument suggests that minimum rpm
and other intrabrand restraints result in higher prices than those an
unrestrained market would produce.6 3 However, such prices do not
reflect an exercise of market power or other consumer harm. They
simply indicate an economic truism: the production of special services
(information) costs money, and firms that produce this information
must recoup their costs to remain in business. 64 A cost-based price
increase, whether promulgated by dealers or a fully integrated firm,
does not reflect an exercise of market power.
65
Telser's account of minimum rpm did not purport to explain all
intrabrand restraints. Instead, he expressly limited his account to dif-
ferentiated products that require presale promotion to attract con-
sumers. 66  At the same time, he explained that such restraints
sometimes facilitated cartelization among manufacturers by prevent-
ing dealers from passing along discounts that manufacturers offered
to undercut the cartel price. 67 However, Telser ultimately concluded
63 See Telser, Fair Trade I, supra note 13, at 91 (noting that absent such restraints deal-
ers "reduce their prices because they avoid the additional cost of the special services").
There is, of course, one exception: intrabrand restraints that involve maximum price fix-
ing. See also Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 348-49 (declaring horizontal maximum rpm unlawful
per se); Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, supra note 59, at 891-900 (explaining how
maximum price fixing can overcome various market failures).
64 See Telser, Fair Trade I, supra note 13, at 91 ("If some retailers do provide these
services and ask for a correspondingly higher price whereas others do not provide the
services and offer to sell the product to consumers at a lower price then an unstable situa-
tion emerges."); see also William F. Baxter, The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CAL.
L. REv. 933, 945-46 (1987) (
Higher retail prices are entirely consistent with the benign explanation of
resale price maintenance. Imposition of [resale price maintenance] re-
flects a judgment on the part of the brand owner that her products will
compete more successfully, both against other branded products and
against generic rivals, if the retailer competes along parameters other than
price. And the retailer's expenses of engaging in those other forms of ri-
valry are financed by setting a retail margin higher than would prevail if
retail price competition were allowed or encouraged.
); Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements, supra note 60, at 156 ("Eveiy restricted dealing ar-
rangement is designed to influence price. It must be. If territorial limits induce dealers to
supply additional service and information, they do so only because they raise the price and
thus call forth competition in the service dimension."); Posner, supra note 57, at 284 ("[1]n
an effort to engross as much as possible of the difference between the retail price ... and
the . . . cost of distribution[,] . . . [dealers] will continue spending ... money on non-
price competition until the marginal cost of the distribution has risen to meet the resale
price.").
65 See Meese, Price Theory, supra note 5, at 81 (explaining that a cost-based price in-
crease induced by restraint does not reflect an exercise of market power); Alan J. Meese,
Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 70 (1997) [hereinafter
Meese, New Institutional Economics] (contending that a cost-based price differential that in-
duces acceptance of a tying contract does not reflect an exercise of market power and thus
does not raise antitrust concerns).
66 See Telser, Fair Trade I, supra note 13, at 95-96.
67 See id. at 96-99.
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that such restraints were presumptive efforts at inducing dealers to
produce optimal presale promotional services. 68
Despite broad acceptance, Telser's theory is not the only benign
account of intrabrand restraints. Professors Benjamin Klein and Ke-
vin Murphy have offered an amendment to Telser's approach. 69 Like
Telser, they begin with the assumption that manufacturers rely upon
the market to distribute their goods. 70 Additionally, they question
neither the prevailing wisdom that intrabrand restraints are generally
procompetitive 71 nor Telser's claim that opportunistic free riding will
prevent dealers from providing special services. 72 Finally, while Klein
and Murphy focus on vertical intrabrand restraints, their analysis ap-
plies equally to horizontal intrabrand restraints. 73
Nonetheless, these scholars dispute Telser's claim that in-
trabrand restraints can themselves cure dealer free riding. For one
thing, such restraints are not airtight; a dealer can circumvent a mini-
mum rpm agreement by offering secret rebates or generous warran-
ties and by bundling discounted items with the main product.74 Thus,
while such restraints may induce nonprice competition, there is no
guarantee that they will induce the particular form of competition
that the manufacturer desires. 75 Moreover, even if a manufacturer
68 See Telser, Fair Trade II, supra note 47, at 410.
69 See Klein, Distribution Restrictions, supra note 19, at 35-36; Klein & Murphy, supra
note 19, at 265-66.
70 Klein and Murphy do mention that complete vertical integration is one method of
distribution. See Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 265-67. At the same time, they appar-
ently assume that such integration is indistinguishable from reliance on the market. They
thus make no effort to explain why a manufacturer might choose to rely on the market to
distribute its goods.
71 See generally Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Ar-
rangements, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 356 (1980) [hereinafter Klein, Contractual Arrangements]
(describing how the existence of transaction costs explains certain contractual provisions).
72 See Klein, Distribution Restrictions, supra note 19, at 5-8 (providing an excellent sum-
mary of "classic free riding").
73 See supra text accompanying notes 3-4 (explaining the distinction between horizon-
tal and vertical intrabrand restraints).
74 Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 266; see id. at 277 ("Clearly, if resale price mainte-
nance is to be effective, the manufacturer must monitor the most obvious forms of non-
price competition that are the closest substitutes for price reductions."); see also, e.g., Ill.
Corporate Travel, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d 722, 728-29 (7th Cir. 1986) (explain-
ing how travel agents circumvented price regulation by bundling low-priced services with
tickets).
75 Klein, Distribution Restrictions, supra note 19, at 7 n.11. Klein explains how a differ-
ent form of competition may occur:
Minimum resale price maintenance, by itself, will not assure that dealers
will supply the quantity and types of service desired by the manufacturer.
Telser ... begs this question by artificially assuming that the promotional
services desired by the manufacturer are the only type of non-price compe-
tition dealers can engage in. Once there are alternative forms of non-price
dealer competition, dealers have the ability and incentive to engage in
"classic dealer free riding" on other dealers' promotional activities by sup-
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can police and enforce such a restraint, i.e., prevent dealers from en-
gaging in undesirable forms of nonprice competition, there is no
guarantee that higher resale prices will result in the promotional activ-
ities the manufacturer hopes to induce. 76 According to Klein and
Murphy, a dealer could choose to pocket any premium that the re-
straint creates, providing no promotional services whatsoever. 77 With-
out some other method of inducing dealers to produce such services,
intrabrand restraints may confer a windfall on dealers while raising
the manufacturer's cost of distribution. 78 In this case, one would not
expect manufacturers to adopt and police such restraints unless they
were designed to obtain or protect market power. 79
Ultimately, the exact scope of Klein and Murphy's critique of
Telser's account remains unclear. On one hand, these authors pur-
port to critique the "standard economic analysis" of vertical restraints,
which they describe as "fundamentally flawed. '80 On the other hand,
as previously explained, Klein and Murphy also seem to admit that the
standard account is sound when it comes to exclusive territories.8 '
This critique of Telser's analysis could undermine the generally
favorable attitude toward intrabrand restraints. 8 2 Indeed, even before
plying consumers with other non-price services that amount to an effective
price reduction.
Id.
76 See id.
77 See Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 266 ("[E]ven if nonprice competition is
unidimensional, retailers may merely take the additional money created by the vertical
restraint and continue to free ride."); see also Pitofsky, No-Frills Case, supra note 9, at 1493
("[T] here is no guarantee that the dealer, once its resale price is raised, will know exactly
what kind and what amount of service the manufacturer has in mind.").
78 See Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 266; see also POSNER, supra note 7, at 147
("The difference between the price at which the manufacturer sells to the dealer and the
dealer's price to the consumer is the manufacturer's cost of distribution.").
79 See, e.g., SULLIVAN & GRIMIES, supra note 8, at 293-94 (explaining how intrabrand
restraints can facilitate collusive behavior between manufacturers); Meese, Price Theoy,
supra note 5, at 93 (noting that absent a plausible legitimate justification, it is proper to
presume that a restriction on competitive rivalry is designed to exercise market power);
Pitofsky, Dr. Miles, supra note 8, at 28 (suggesting that minimum rpm is often symptomatic
of a dealer cartel).
80 Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 266.
81 Klein and Murphy suggest at one point that exclusive territories (but not minimum
rpm) can induce dealers to engage in an optimal mix of presale promotional services. See
id. at 273. But this seems inconsistent with the authors' previous assertion that "[v] ertical
restraints, by themselves, do not create a direct incentive for retailers to supply desired
services." Id. at 266. Despite this suggestion, Klein and Murphy also state that their "per-
formance bond" theory of vertical restraints applies to "any situation where it is not eco-
nomical for the manufacturer to write an explicit contract" governing a dealer's service
obligations. Id. at 267. This includes situations to which Telser applied his special services
theory. See Telser, Fair Trade I, supra note 13, at 92-95 (explaining that the special services
rationale for minimum rpm applies only to circumstances in which the alternative of con-
tracting for such services is prohibitively expensive).
82 See, e.g., SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 8, at 306 (suggesting that "use of a distribu-
tion restraint, unless tied to contractual commitments, will not assure any change in the
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Klein and Murphy published their thesis, other scholars raised some
of the same objections to Telser's theory. 83 Nonetheless, Klein and
Murphy did more than critique the standard argument; they offered
their own benign account of intrabrand restraints in an effort to ac-
count for a far wider range of such restraints than Telser's special ser-
vices argument can explain. 84  According to Klein and Murphy,
intrabrand restraints serve as private enforcement mechanisms that
supplement the imperfect remedies that the state provides through
public contract law.8 5 By guaranteeing dealers a higher return, in-
trabrand restraints can create a future stream of income that dealers
would forfeit if terminated. 6 This stream of income serves as a sort of
"performance bond" or "hostage" that manufacturers may take from a
dealer who fails to meet its contractual obligations, including obliga-
tions to produce promotional services. 87 Moreover, to induce the
retailer's performance" (footnote omitted)). It should be noted that Professors Sullivan
and Grimes do not discuss Klein and Murphy's account of the procompetitive benefits of
such restraints.
83 See, e.g., Pitofsky, Dr. Miles, supra note 8, at 29 (characterizing as "nonsense" the
claim that minimum rpm will induce dealers to provide "the right service in the right
amount at the right time").
84 See supra note 66 and accompanying text (explaining that Telser's approach only
purports to explain a subset of intrabrand restraints); see also Klein & Murphy, supra note
19, at 267 ("[O]ur theory of vertical restraints is shown to be applicable to any situation
where it is not economical for the manufacturer to write an explicit contract with its deal-
ers regarding some aspect of desired dealer performance." (emphasis added)).
85 See Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 267-28 ("[We assume] that it is not economi-
cally feasible for a manufacturer to write an explicit, enforceable contract with a dealer for
the supply of desired dealer services," and "[w]e assume that ... an explicit contract re-
garding [dealer] performance cannot be made because dealer performance may be pro-
hibitively cosdy to measure and to specify in a way that contractual breach and the extent
of damages can be proven to the satisfaction of the court.").
86 See id. at 269-76; see also Goldberg, Retailing Services, supra note 7, at 749 (arguing
that vertical restraints can be methods of providing dealers with deferred compensation
that they will forfeit if terminated); PatrickJ. Kaufmann & Francine Lafontaine, Costs of
Control: The Source of Economic Rents for McDonald's Franchisees, 37J.L. & ECON. 417, 437-39
(1994) (relying in part on Klein and Murphy's model to interpret various aspects of the
McDonald's franchise system); Andrew N. Kleit, Efficiencies Without Economists: The Early
Years of Resale Price Maintenance, 59 S. EcoN. J. 597, 599-600 (1993) (outlining Klein and
Murphy's approaches as one possible explanation for intrabrand restraints). Notably,
while Judge Posner invokes the Klein and Murphy account of distribution restraints, he
does not reject the Telser account. See POSNER, supra note 7, at 172-75. Nor does he offer
a defense of Telser against the Klein and Murphy critique. This Article supplies such a
defense and also explains why the Telser and Klein and Murphy accounts are not mutually
exclusive. See infra Parts 1l-II.
87 See Goldberg, Retailing Services, supra note 7, at 749 ("If the privilege of continued
future dealing with a particular manufacturer is a valuable asset,... [tihe greater the value
of that asset (the higher the rewards of dealing with this manufacturer), the more the
retailer risks by acting against the manufacturer's interests or orders."); Klein, Contractual
Arrangements, supra note 71, at 357; Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 268, 274-76 ("The
potential loss of this future quasi-rent stream takes the place of a potential court-imposed
sanction in assuring dealer performance."); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Us-
ing Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519-20 (1983) [hereinafter Wil-
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dealer to remain loyal, the manufacturer must tailor the restraint so as
to allow the dealer to exercise a portion of the market power that the
manufacturer possesses due to product differentiation.8 8 Like Telser,
then, Klein and Murphy assume that such restraints result in higher
prices. But the source of the increase is not simply the cost of produc-
ing information; it also includes dealers' exercise of market power.8 9
Of course, the mere existence of a performance bond does not
encourage dealers to produce special services or, for that matter, any-
thing else. A performance bond can only encourage a dealer to carry
out those obligations that it undertakes. 90 Under this analysis, in-
trabrand restraints can encourage special services only if the parties
understand that the dealer must provide the particular services that
the manufacturer desires. 91 This obligation need not be enforceable
in court. It may instead take the form of an implicit contract.92 More-
over, it is not enough that the parties subjectively understand the exis-
tence of the obligation; the manufacturer also must police and
enforce a dealer's compliance. 9 3 Only then will intrabrand restraints
"cause" dealers to provide promotional services, just as the threat of
an action for breach of contract would induce the production of such
services if the legal system functioned smoothly.9 4
liamson, Credible Commitments] (arguing that the "economic equivalent of hostages" can
make contractual commitments credible).
88 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, § 1.4, at 36-37 (sketching economics of product dif-
ferentiation); Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 274-76 (arguing that exclusive territories
will not suffice to induce dealer promotion unless the territory confers market power that
the dealer would forfeit after termination by the manufacturer). It should be noted that
Professor Telser assumed that the special services argument would apply only to cases in
which a manufacturer was selling a differentiated product and thus possessed market
power. See Telser, Fair Trade I, supra note 13, at 95-96. He did not, however, argue that
minimum rpm that induced special services caused dealers to price above their costs. See
supra text accompanying notes 63-65 (explaining that Telser's approach does not imply
that minimum rpm induces dealers to price above cost).
89 It should be noted that, under the Rule of Reason, proof that a restraint results in
an exercise of market power suffices to establish a prima facie case. See Meese, Price Theory,
supra note 5, at 79-80.
90 See Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 282.
91 See id. at 282-85.
92 See id. at 267-68; Klein, Contractual Arrangements, supra note 71, at 360.
93 See Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 269 (stating that use of vertical restraints as a
performance bond requires the manufacturer to make a credible commitment to termi-
nate shirking dealers).
94 Id. at 285 ("In any event, the manufacturer must always monitor dealer perform-
ance and terminate dealers who violate the implicit contractual understanding regarding
the supply of promotional services."); Kleit, supra note 86, at 599 ("[Under the Klein and
Murphy model], [i]f the retailer 'misbehaves' the manufacturer cuts off its supply of
goods, thus denying the retailer the stream of RPM-induced quasi-rents."). Klein and Mur-
phy also claim that intrabrand restraints provide dealers with a "payment" to compensate
them for the provision of such services. SeeKlein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 285. It is not
clear why such a payment is necessary. If manufacturers enforce such obligations by threat-
ening to terminate, then all dealers will incur the cost of such obligations and include that
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As noted above, Klein and Murphy purport to explain more re-
straints than are explained by Telser's special services argument. In
particular, Klein and Murphy argue that manufacturers can employ
intrabrand restraints to enforce any obligation that dealers incur, in-
cluding but not limited to the obligation to provide promotional ser-
vices. 95 Indeed, the case study these scholars employ to illustrate their
analysis involves a beer manufacturer's attempt to protect its goodwill
by maintaining the quality of a product requiring certain forms of ro-
tation and storage at the wholesale and retail levels. 96 Left to their
own devices, dealers may shirk these responsibilities so that other
dealers and the manufacturer internalize most of the resulting
harm.97 By conferring exclusive territories or setting a minimum
price, Klein and Murphy argue, a manufacturer may create a mecha-
nism for enforcing guidelines that govern a dealer's treatment of the
product.98 Although such guidelines prevent a form of dealer shirk-
ing, they do not induce production of presale promotion as Telser's
special services theory envisions. 99 According to Klein and Murphy,
cost in the price to consumers. Thus, if manufacturers induce dealers to provide perform-
ance bonds through intrabrand restraints or otherwise, there is no need to "purchase"
promotional or other services from dealers.
95 See Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 280 ("Both minimum resale price mainte-
nance and nonprice restraints, such as exclusive territories, assure dealer performance of
elements of the contractual understanding that are not enforceable in court."); id. at 265
(noting that Telser's "standard analysis" applies "when it is not feasible for a manufacturer
to write explicit, court-enforceable contracts with retailers for the supply of particular ser-
vices"); Kleit, supra note 86, at 599 (describing various obligations, including obligations to
provide presale service, that vertical restraints serve to enforce under the performance
bond theory); Telser, Fair Trade I, supra note 13, at 92-95 (explaining that minimum rpm
is necessary only when parties cannot write explicit contracts governing presale
promotion).
96 In particular, Klein and Murphy analyze Coors's decision to impose exclusive terri-
tories and maximum resale price maintenance on retailers selling Coors beer. See Klein &
Murphy, supra note 19, at 280-82 (discussing Adolph Coors Co. v. FJ'C, 497 F.2d 1178 (10th
Cir. 1974)). According to these scholars, Coors adopted these restraints to create a mecha-
nism for enforcing retailers' obligations to refrigerate and rotate Coors's product. See id.
Absent some enforceable obligation, dealers could shirk their responsibilities to maintain
product quality, knowing that other dealers and the manufacturer would bear part of the
reputational cost that such shirking would create. See id. at 281; see alsoJames A. Brickley,
Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from Franchising, 42 J.L. & ECON. 745,
748-49 (1999) (explaining how franchisees often lack sufficient incentives to invest in
product quality because some portion of the benefits of such investment will accrue to
other franchisees); Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics of Franchise
Tying Contracts, 28J.L. & ECON. 345, 346-48 (1985) (discussing how franchisors can employ
tying contracts to ensure that franchisees utilize quality inputs); Paul H. Rubin, The Theory
of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 223, 226-30 (1978)
(arguing that franchisors motivate franchisees and avoid shirking by providing them with a
share of the franchise profits).
97 See Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 281.
98 See id. at 281-82.
99 While such shirking would be a form of free-riding, it would not be the sort of free
riding on promotional expenditures by fellow dealers that Telser identified. See id. at 281
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intrabrand restraints can be procompetitive even if the product in
question does not require the provision of presale promotional ser-
vices.' 0 0 In this sense, the "performance bond" account of intrabrand
restraints actually bolsters the presumption in favor of such
agreements.
While the special services and performance bond accounts of in-
trabrand restraints obviously conflict, they share some features as well.
Both accounts take as given the boundaries of the firms employing
intrabrand restraints: like price theory, both accept as an unexplained
datum the manufacturer's decision to rely upon the market to dis-
tribute its goods. 10 1 Neither account asks why a manufacturer might
choose to rely upon the market for this purpose. Moreover, both the
special services and the performance bond accounts assume that reli-
ance upon independent dealers will result in a market failure in the
form of inadequate promotional expenditures. Both accounts may
also explain certain horizontal intrabrand restraints, such as a joint
venture's imposition of exclusive territories on distributors. 10 2 Thus,
both accounts support a presumption that such restraints are
procompetitive.10 3
Finally, both accounts rest on a "planning" view of intrabrand re-
straints. Namely, they assume-consistent with price theory-that the
manufacturer possesses the knowledge required to determine the spe-
("It is clear that these refrigeration and product rotation services do not fit the standard
'consumer free-riding' paradigm."); Telser, Fair Trade II, supra note 47, at 410 (agreeing
with Klein and Murphy that the Coors example "is not a valid instance of the special service
argument"); see also Kleit, supra note 86, at 598-600 (describing such shirking as involving a
"vertical externality" and distinguishing this externality from the "horizontal externality"
posited by Telser).
100 See Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 281 (explaining how intrabrand restraints can
be part of a scheme to induce dealers to maintain product quality even where investments
in quality do not constitute special services of the sort emphasized by Telser).
101 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 7 (discussing how neoclassical price theory often
took the boundaries of the firm as a technologically determined given); Stigler, supra note
34, at 185; supra note 34 and accompanying text (explaining that the price-theoretic ap-
proach to industrial organization took as a given the boundaries of firms, determined by
technological considerations); see also Tesler, Fair Trade I, supra note 13, at 87 (assuming
without explanation that reliance on dealers may be less cosdy than self-distribution).
102 See Meese, Quick Look, supra note 59, at 479-81 (relying upon Telser's analysis to
explain horizontal intrabrand restraints).
103 To be sure, both the Telser and the Klein and Murphy accounts are merely "exem-
plifying theories"; that is, they simply establish that such restraints can or may be procom-
petitive in some circumstances. See generally Franklin M. Fisher, Games Economists Play: A
Noncooperative View, 20 RANDJ. ECON. 113, 118 (1989) ("Exemplifying theory does not tell
us what must happen. Rather it tells us what can happen."). Still, subsequent empirical
work suggests that a presumption in favor of vertical restraints is welljustified. See PAULINE
M. IPPOLITO, RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: ECONOMIC EVIDENCE FROM LITIGATION 76 (1988);
THOMAS R. OVERSTREET, JR., RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: ECONOMIC THEORIES AND EMPIRI-
CAL EVIDENCE 160-63 (1983); see also Telser, Fair Trade II, supra note 47, at 410 (citing
IPPOLITO, supra).
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cial services that dealers should perform.' 0 4 Again, Klein and Mur-
phy's view depends upon a claim that manufacturers and dealers
agree, explicitly or implicitly, that dealers must provide the promo-
tional services that the manufacturer designates.1 0 5 Under this analy-
sis, intrabrand restraints are simply one method of "supporting" an
independent contractual obligation-a method indistinguishable
from a performance bond or a liquidated damages provision. 10 6 If
contract law provided perfect and costless remedies for a dealer's
breach of such obligations, no bond would be necessary. 10 7
Similarly, Telser asserts that minimum rpm helps ensure that
dealers provide the services that the manufacturer envisions. In his
seminal article, Telser claims that there are special services "that the
manufacturer thinks necessary to sell his product."108 Telser also states
that dealers will not provide such services unless the manufacturer sets
and enforces prices sufficient to cover the services' cost.'0 9 At the
same time, however, Telser does not explain how manufacturers
104 See supra note 35 and accompanying text (explaining that price theory assumed
that firms and individuals could costlessly gather and transmit knowledge).
105 See Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 285. Klein and Murphy state:
In the absence of vertical integration, the manufacturer must adopt a mar-
keting arrangement that assures the supply by dealers of a greater level of
promotional services than those dealers would voluntarily supply. The
manufacturer accomplishes this by creating an implicit contractual under-
standing with the dealer whereby the dealer agrees to provide the desired
level of promotional services in exchange for payment from the manufac-
turer .... [T]he manufacturer must always monitor dealer performance
and terminate dealers who violate the implicit contractual understanding
regarding the supply of promotional services.
Id.
106 It should be noted in this regard that Klein and Murphy state that "measurement
problems" prevent the manufacturer and dealer from agreeing on an enforceable promo-
tional obligation. See id. While these scholars do not elaborate on the nature of these
problems, they apparently assume that the manufacturer would know what to measure, i.e.,
the manufacturer would know what sort of service it would want a dealer to provide. See id.
Otherwise, the manufacturer would have no basis for terminating a dealer and thus depriv-
ing it of the performance bond.
107 See id. at 267; see also WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 168-69 (basing an analysis of
"hostages" and self-enforcing agreements on the assumption that judicial enforcement of
agreements is nonexistent); Klein, Contractual Arrangements, supra note 71, at 356-58
(same).
108 Telser, Fair Trade I, supra note 13, at 91 (emphasis added); see Telser, Fair Trade II,
supra note 47, at 409 ("A manufacturer wants a distributor to furnish a potential customer
with special services associated with the product. Typically, these are point-of-purchase
sales promotions or information about the particular product."). Professor Williamson
characterized Telser's approach as presuming that dealers agree to provide "specified min-
imum services," including advertising, in return for an intrabrand restraint. See Oliver E.
Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost
Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 953, 976 (1979) [hereinafter Williamson, Vertical Market
Restrictions].
109 See Telser, Fair Trade I, supra note 13, at 91-92; see also Williamson, Vertical Market
Restrictions, supra note 108, at 976-78 (suggesting that intrabrand restraints accompany
specified dealer obligations, including obligations to advertise).
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would acquire the knowledge necessary to determine which services
they desire. Nor does he explain how minimum rpm would induce
dealers to produce these particular services. 110 Professor Howard
Marvel, who defends Telser against Klein and Murphy, characterizes
the special services approach as follows: "[O]nce attractive margins
are offered through RPM, dealers will compete for those margins in
ways that work to the manufacturer's interest.""' Under this view,
Marvel claims, minimum rpm is "self-monitoring."112 However, like
Telser, Marvel does not respond to the claim that minimum rpm will
lead to forms of nonprice competition that the manufacturer does not
desire or that dealers will simply pocket the premium that such re-
straints create.
Telser's discussion of possible alternatives to minimum rpm con-
firms his assumption that such a restraint is a method of ensuring the
production of services that the manufacturer envisions. According to
Telser, the chief alternative to maintained prices is a scheme whereby
a manufacturer offers its product to dealers at two different prices: a
low price for dealers who agree to provide the special service that the
manufacturer seeks and a high price to those who decline to make
such an agreement.11 3 This scheme, of course, would require the
manufacturer to determine in advance the precise service it wished
the dealer receiving the lower price to provide and to communicate
this knowledge to dealers. 1 4 Or, the manufacturer could "accomplish
110 Indeed, when Klein and Murphy challenged him on this score, Telser simply re-
peated an assertion that minimum rpm would induce dealers to engage in the special
services desired by the manufacturer:
The manufacturer may eliminate free-riding by imposing on all distributors
a minimum resale price set at a level high enough to remunerate for the
cost of the special services. The customer has no incentive to seek the prod-
uct from another distributor at a lower price because, by hypothesis, no
distributor can offer it at a price below the minimum set by the manufac-
turer. One distributor cannot free load on another, and each obtains an
incentive to supply the special services jointly with the physical product be-
cause only in this way can they sell the product. Moreover, distributors
must compete for customers by providing the special services. The conclu-
sion is this: the minimum resale price is a means of attaining an efficient
equilibrium when the circumstances for special services apply.
See Telser, Fair Trade II, supra note 47, at 410 (emphasis added). Thus, Telser assumes that
manufacturers will set prices at a level "high enough" to provide "the" services that the
manufacturer desires. Presumably, then, the manufacturer will know the cost of the ser-
vices it wishes the dealer to provide. Lastly, Telser apparently assumes that, to obtain cus-
tomers, dealers will engage in nonprice competition, and that that competition will just
happen to be the special services that the manufacturer desires.
11 Marvel, supra note 54, at 64-65.
112 See id.
113 See Telser, Fair Trade I, supra note 13, at 93 ("Let those who agree to provide special
servicesjointly with the product pay a lower price at the factory gate than those who do not
provide the special services.").
114 Such a scheme would be indistinguishable from a manufacturer's decision to offer
two different distributorship agreements-one low-priced agreement that contains provi-
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the same thing" by "paying retailers directly an amount equal to the
cost of the special services they provide."' 15 However, this assumes
that the manufacturer knows what services dealers should provide, as
well as the costs of these services, and can therefore price them ac-
cordingly. 1 6 Each alternative would require a manufacturer to moni-
tor the behavior of its dealers to determine whether they actually
provided "these requisite services."' "17
According to Telser, each option would produce the same quan-
tity and type of promotion as minimum rpm.118 Consequently, Telser
argues that minimum rpm is only superior to these alternatives insofar
as it may be cheaper to enforce than direct payments to dealers in
return for services. 119 Telser does not consider the costs that manu-
facturers would have to incur to determine what services dealers
should provide. He apparently assumed that manufacturers who
choose to employ minimum rpm could readily determine the exact
form of promotion they desired and, if they wished, could communi-
cate these expectations to dealers. Minimum rpm was superior only
because it did not require manufacturers to monitor compliance with
such expectations. 20
sions deterring opportunism and another high-priced agreement that allows distributors to
behave as they please. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 23-29, 32-34 (contending that a
potential victim of opportunism will charge its trading partner a relatively low price if the
partner agrees to contractual provisions that will attenuate opportunism); Alan J. Meese,
Price Theory and Vertical Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA L. REv. 143, 187-88
(1997) [hereinafter Meese, Vertical Restraints] (noting that a manufacturer can induce a
dealer to agree to intrabrand restraints by charging higher prices to dealers that decline to
enter such agreements); Meese, New Institutional Economics, supra note 65, at 69-70 (sug-
gesting that a seller can employ discounts to induce a buyer to enter a tying contract that
can obviate buyer opportunism).
115 Telser, Fair Trade I, supra note 13, at 94.
116 To be sure, a manufacturer could simply promise ex post payment for all promo-
tional expenses that a dealer could document. However, such an approach would create a
moral hazard: dealers would not internalize these promotional costs and would overspend.
Therefore, the manufacturer would want to limit such reimbursement to those activities
that it deemed cost-beneficial.
117 See Telser, Fair Trade I, supra note 13, at 94 ("[The manufacturer] would need to
check the performance of the retailers to be sure that they actually provide these requisite
services" and would have "to survey retailers to see that they do indeed provide the special
services and do not simply fritter away the direct payments."). Presumably, "requisite ser-
vices" would only include those deemed necessary by the manufacturer.
118 See id. at 93 (concluding that a differential pricing scheme can "obtain the same
result as by imposing resale price maintenance on the retailers"); id. at 94 (noting that a
manufacturer can accomplish the same thing as a differential pricing scheme "by paying
distributors directly" to provide services). Telser drew one possible distinction between
minimum rpm and these alternatives. Minimum rpm, he said, would compensate distribu-
tors only to the extent that the special services they provided resulted in actual sales. See id.
(characterizing this phenomenon as an "advantage of price maintenance").
119 See id.
120 See id. at 92-94.
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Thus, Telser assumed that minimum rpm would induce the same
mix of promotional services as an explicit contract governing a
dealer's service obligations without explaining how minimum rpm
would have this effect. Nor did he consider Klein and Murphy's sub-
sequent suggestion that dealers might choose to engage in forms of
nonprice competition that the manufacturer would not desire. In-
deed, in a response to the Klein and Murphy critique, Telser simply
repeated his assertion that minimum rpm would lead dealers to pro-
duce the promotional services that manufacturers desire.' 2 1
B. Dissents from the Benign Accounts
Some scholars still cling to the inhospitality tradition, disputing
the claim that intrabrand restraints are generally efficient. 122 Al-
though these scholars center their criticisms on Telser's account,
some of their criticisms apply equally to Klein and Murphy's perform-
ance bond approach. Some criticisms react to the planning assump-
tion inherent in each approach 123 and focus on vertical intrabrand
restraints, but the critiques are equally relevant to horizontal in-
trabrand restraints. 124
To some, the Telser account imputes an unrealistic omniscience
to the manufacturer by assuming that the manufacturer knows not
only what type of special services a dealer should provide in local mar-
kets but also the cost of such services. As a result, some scholars argue
that minimum rpm and other intrabrand restraints are tantamount to
coercive central planning, albeit under the guise of private con-
tracts. 125 A better policy, these scholars say, would allow "the mar-
ket"-unfettered choice by dealers, and not a distant administrator-
to determine the level and type of promotional services as well as re-
121 See supra note 110.
122 See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (discussing inhospitality tradition).
123 See supra notes 28, 104 and accompanying text.
124 See, e.g., infta notes 145-46 and accompanying text (explaining that a critique
based on less restrictive alternatives applies equally to horizontal restraints).
125 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 54-60, Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977) (No. 76-15); LAWRENCE A.NTHONY SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 381-82 (1977) (ar-
guing that even if retail price maintenance results in the optimal deployment of resources
to a given sector, "it could not be as sensitive to changed conditions" as unbridled rivalry);
Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140,
1184 (1981) ("The per se rule against vertical price-fixing reflects the value that sellers of
goods should have the freedom to charge the price they see fit."); Pitofsky, No-Frills Case,
supra note 9, at 1493 ("[A]uthorizing the manufacturer to decide what mix of products
and services is desirable, instead of allowing the market to decide that question, is inconsis-
tent with the nation's commitment to a competitive process."). This critique rests in part
on a normative conception of antitrust law that values "freedom" from contractual restraint
for its own sake. However, as I have demonstrated elsewhere, this "normative" approach to
intrabrand restraints also relies upon purely economic (descriptive) assumptions about
retail markets. See Meese, Vertical Restraints, supra note 114, at 172-84.
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sale prices. 126 Such an approach would ensure that those closest to
the situation make promotional decisions, honoring antitrust's com-
mitment to a "competitive process."'127
Scholars also question the Telser special services account along
the lines emphasized by Klein and Murphy, arguing that there is no
guarantee that minimum rpm will induce dealers to provide any pro-
motional services; dealers may simply pocket the premium that re-
straints create. 128 Critics further question whether dealers subject to
minimum rpm will engage in nonprice competition that the manufac-
turer desires.' 29 Indeed, the former Chairman of the Federal Trade
Commission, Robert Pitofsky, labeled as "nonsense" the claim that
minimum rpm would induce dealers to produce the presale services
"desired by the manufacturer." 130 For these scholars, the failure to
explain how intrabrand restraints induce dealers to produce appropri-
ate types and quantities of promotion undermines any presumption
that the restraints are procompetitive. 131
For some scholars, the absence of a contract or other provision
delineating what the manufacturer expects suggests that the restraint
will not induce the desired promotional services. 13 2 After all, if manu-
facturers expect that intrabrand restraints will lead dealers to provide
"special services," and if an intrabrand restraint cannot itself induce
such services, then one might expect the parties to memorialize these
126 See SULLIVAN, supra note 125, at 382 ("[There is an extravagant arrogance on be-
half of manufacturers [for them to claim] that, despite their lack of involvement and expe-
rience at the resale level, they can better identify the optimum price, scale and level of
promotion . . . than could dealers, involved and experienced . . . and possessed of that
market information."); id. at 386 ("Manufacturer justifications have one common charac-
teristic-they presuppose that an administered decision, a centralized decision made by
the manufacturer and which governs all dealers, will in some sense be better than decisions
made by dealers in the competitive marketplace."); Flynn, supra note 8, at 1139-40, n.223;
Pitofsky, Dr. Miles, supra note 8, at 29 ("If we ... permit suppliers to fix resale prices[,] ...
we would in effect be turning over to the suppliers the decision on the amounts and kinds
of service that are needed. It is far better ... to leave that decision to the free market.").
127 See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 8, at 15-16; Flynn, supra note 8, at 1139-40; Fox,
supra note 125, at 1154; Pitofsky, No-Frills Case, supra note 9, at 1493.
128 See, e.g., SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 8, at 305-06; Carstensen, supra note 8, at
606 (contending that intrabrand restraints are susceptible to cheating and therefore pro-
duce few net benefits).
129 See Pitofsky, No-Frills Case, supra note 9, at 1493.
130 See Pitofsky, Dr. Miles, supra note 8, at 29.
131 See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
132 See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 739-48 (1988) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that agreement between manufacturer and dealer to terminate an-
other price-cutting dealer should be unlawful per se absent another legitimate purpose,
such as an accompanying agreement on promotional services that the distributor should
provide); SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 8, at 306 ("If a retailer chooses not to provide
these amenities [desired by the manufacturer], use of a distribution restraint, unless tied to
contractual commitments, will not assure any change in the retailer's performance.").
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expectations. 13 3 Failure to do so could place a dealer at risk of arbi-
trary termination-a risk the manufacturer would find incorporated
in the reduced price it could charge for its product.1 34 Thus, the ab-
sence of express provisions regarding the promotional efforts desired
by the manufacturer arguably challenges a manufacturer's claim that
an intrabrand restraint is designed to overcome market failure by in-
ducing the production of such services.13 5 Absent benefits, the logical
implication is that such restraints represent an exercise of market
power to the detriment of consumers.1 3 6
Some scholars attack minimum rpm or exclusive territory agree-
ments as anticompetitive, arguing that manufacturers could obtain
the same level of promotion by employing methods less restrictive of
rivalry between dealers.13 7 These scholars concede that reliance on
dealers' unfettered discretion will not result in an efficient level of
promotional services because of the opportunistic free riding Telser
has identified. 138 This critique flows from the "planning" assumption
inherent in Telser's analysis, an assumption that Klein and Murphy
embrace as well. 139 After all, if a manufacturer knows what services it
133 Such memorialization would not necessarily create a contract plausibly enforceable
in the courts. It would, however, give distributors notice of the promotional services manu-
facturers expect them to provide. The performance bond theory implies that a manufac-
turer that does not provide such guidance would suffer in the marketplace because dealers
would come to fear that they may become victims of arbitrary termination.
134 See Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related
Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 29-31 (1993) (asserting that parties will pay higher prices
for more favorable contractual terms); Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic
Analysis After Kodak, 3 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 62 (1993) (noting that change in contractual
price will compensate parties who place themselvese at risk of opportunism by trading
partners); Klein, Contractual Arrangements, supra note 71, at 359-60; Alan J. Meese, Regula-
tion of Franchisor Opportunism and Production of the Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly or
Competition Between the States?, 23 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL' 61, 71 (1999).
135 See Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 739 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (claiming, without citation of
evidence, that vertical nonprice restraints "typically" involve dealer agreement to "certain
standards in its advertising, promotion, product display, and provision of repair and main-
tenance services in order to protect the goodwill of the manufacturer's product."); id. at
740-742 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (arguing that agreement to terminate price-cutting dealer
was "naked" and thus should be unlawful per se absent accompanying agreement on pro-
motional services that the dealer should provide); see also Carstensen, supra note 8, at 591
("The free-rider explanation for overt restraints on resale competition implies the exis-
tence of a prior commitment ... by the reseller to provide some costly service or effort ....
Where only [intrabrand restraints] exist .... the producer [presumably] has some market
power, and the investments required are not substantially vulnerable to .. .opportu-
nism."); Rudolph J. Peritz, A Genealogy of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 511,
549-50 (1989) (endorsing Justice Stevens' reasoning on this point). By its terms, this cri-
tique cannot apply to the Klein and Murphy account, which assumes that manufacturers
inform dealers of their respective obligations.
136 See, e.g., Carstensen, supra note 8, at 591.
137 See id. at 608-09; Pitofsky, No-Frills Case, supra note 9, at 1493.
138 Id.
139 See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
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desires and sets a retail price accordingly, then presumably it can com-
municate these expectations to dealers.1 40
In some cases such alternatives consist simply of less onerous con-
tractual restrictions. For example, some scholars argue that a manu-
facturer could assign dealers so-called "areas of primary responsibility"
instead of exclusive territories, 141 requiring dealers to make their
"best efforts" in particular territories while still allowing them to sell
wherever they please. 142 Second, manufacturers could enter into ex-
plicit contracts requiring dealers to engage in the exact promotional
services desired. 143 Finally, manufacturers could produce the same or
greater benefits by integrating forward into the distribution function,
engaging in such promotional activities themselves. 144 Scholars also
suggest similar alternatives for horizontal intrabrand restraints.145 For
140 Cf supra notes 104-21 and accompanying text (explaining that Telser apparently
assumed that a manufacturer can costlessly determine dealers' optimal promotional
strategy).
141 See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 272 n.12 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring) (noting that primary responsibility clauses have been upheld in prior
cases); SULLIVAN, supra note 125, at 408 (suggesting that a primary responsibility clause or a
"mandate for specified levels of promotion" adequately protects manufacturers' interests);
Pitofsky, Joint Ventures, supra note 8, at 1621 (arguing that "primary responsibility or profit
pass-over clauses" are less restrictive means of achieving the legitimate objectives of exclu-
sive territories); Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Con-
scious Parallelism and Refusals To Deal, 75 HARv. L. REV. 655, 699 (1962) (arguing that
legitimate objectives of exclusive territories could be achieved through "such less restrictive
alternatives as a clause assigning each dealer a territory of primary responsibility which he
agrees to use his best efforts to develop").
142 See Turner, supra note 141, at 699.
143 See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 125, at 416 ("The manufacturer can expressly require
every dealer to provide whatever display, service or other facility, or whatever commitment
to local promotional activity the manufacturer regards as needed."); SULLIVAN & GRIMES,
supra note 8, at 304-05 (identifying promotional allowances, where manufacturer pays
dealer to engage in services "that the producer deems most critical" as a less restrictive
alternative); Pitofsky, No-Frills Case, supra note 9, at 1493 ("If a manufacturer really wants
additional advertising, the common commercial practice is to contract separately for it. If
a manufacturer wants a warranty program, the same solution applies."); Pitofsky, Dr. Miles,
supra note 8, at 29 ("[I]f suppliers want more advertising or more generous warranties,
they and their dealers draw up a contract specifying the terms of a cooperative arrange-
ment ....").
144 See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 8, at 505 (identifying an example in which verti-
cal integration operates as a less restrictive alternative); Carstensen, supra note 8, at 608
("[T]he most plausible response [to dealer free riding] will remain that of internalizing
the activity within the organization in such a way that free riding is made unfeasible by the
very nature of the business organization."); Pitofsky, Dr. Miles, supra note 8, at 29 (arguing
that one alternative to minimum rpm is for "the suppliers [to] provide the services
themselves").
145 See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 8, at 223 (endorsing less restrictive alternative
test as applied to horizontal intrabrand restraints); Pitofsky, Joint Ventures, supra note 8, at
1621 (suggesting that venture partners may achieve legitimate objectives of exclusive terri-
tories via primary responsibility clauses). The enforcement agencies take a similar ap-
proach. See, e.g., FED. TRAnE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 3.36(b) (2000) [hereinafter ANTITRUST GUIDE-
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these scholars, the presence of readily availabile alternatives that pro-
duce the same or greater benefits suggests that intrabrand restraints-
whether vertical or horizontal-are generally anticompetitive.1
4 6
Proponents of the Telser approach have responded to several of
these critiques. 14 7 Take, for example, the argument that intrabrand
restraints involve undue interference in a dealer's decisionmaking
and are thus analogous to impermissible central planning."4 8 Al-
though intrabrand restraints do involve a manufacturer's "administra-
tion" of portions of the dealer's promotional agenda,1 49  such
"administration" occurs daily in a capitalist economy;1 50 indeed, econ-
omists treat the presence of (private) "administration" as the defining
characteristic of the private, capitalistic business firm.' 5 1 Formation of
a firm entails the delegation of an individual's control of his labor or
property to an employer, who in turn agrees to administer these re-
sources. 15 2 Unlike central planning, such delegation is entirely volun-
tary, and thus presumptively efficient.' 53  A fortiori, a dealer's
delegation of authority over its promotional or pricing decisions to
the manufacturer is no more problematic than an employee's delega-
tion of such authority to an employer. 15 4
LINES] (noting that neither agency will find an intrabrand restraint reasonably necessary if
less restrictive alternatives are available).
146 See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 8, at 223, 664-67; Carstensen, supra note 8, at
606-08; Pitofsky, Dr. Miles, supra note 8, at 29.
147 Klein and Murphy have not responded to criticisms of their analysis. This is not
surprising, as scholars hostile to intrabrand restraints focus their critique on Telser's spe-
cial services theory. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text. Indeed, as noted ear-
lier, while some scholars use portions of Klein and Murphy's analysis against Telser's
approach, they do not address Klein and Murphy's assertion that intrabrand restraints are
generally efficient. See generally Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 266-67, 295-96 (contend-
ing that intrabrand restraints are usually procompetitive).
148 See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
149 See SULLIVAN, supra note 125, at 384-85.
150 See Victor P. Goldberg, The Law and Economics of Vertical Restrictions: A Relational
Perspective, 58 TEx. L. REv. 91, 107 (1979) [hereinafter Goldberg, Relational Perspective].
151 See, e.g., Steven N.S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26J.L. & ECON. 1, 10
(1983) (arguing that activity within a firm involves "direct[ion] [of inputs] by a visible
hand, not by the invisible hand of a price mechanism"); R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm,
4 ECONOMICA 386, 387-89 (1937) [hereinafter Coase, Nature of the Firm].
152 See Cheung, supra note 151, at 5 (noting that a firm involves "a form of contract
that binds the input owner to follow directions instead of determining his own course by
continual reference to the market prices of a variety of activities he may perform"); R.H.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Meaning, 4J.L. ECON. & ORG. 19, 28-29 (1988) [hereinafter
Coase, Meaning of Firm] (stating that the firm is a "special kind of contract").
153 See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 151, at 390; Goldberg, Relational Perspective,
supra note 150, at 107; Meese, Vertical Restraints, supra note 114, at 187.
154 Invocation of the "competitive process" begs the question of the appropriate defini-
tion of "competition." As I show elsewhere, many scholars hostile to intrabrand restraints
adopt an atomistic, "technological" conception of competition that does not recognize
intrabrand restraints as competitive. See Meese, Vertical Restraints, supra note 114, at 183-95
(explaining that the so-called "Populist" approach to such restraints rests upon a price-
theoretic model of "competition"). By contrast, reliance upon a more modern model of
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In response to the less restrictive alternatives argument, some
scholars counter that such alternatives are usually less effective than
straightforward minimum rpm or exclusive territories and cost more
to negotiate and enforce.155 For instance, areas of primary responsi-
bility require retailers to serve their own areas well but do not prevent
retailers from serving other areas and thus free riding on the efforts of
other dealers. 156 Similarly, the claim that manufacturers could readily
negotiate and enforce requirements that dealers engage in particular
promotional services seems exaggerated. Such negotiations cost time
and money, and rules governing the nonenforcement of form con-
tracts make it difficult for parties to memorialize the manufacturer's
promotional expectations. 157 Even if parties manage to negotiate de-
tailed promotional obligations, the manufacturer would incur prohib-
itive costs in monitoring and enforcing them. 58 Thus, these scholars
conclude, intrabrand restraints such as minimum rpm and exclusive
territories, while more restrictive of rivalry, are also more effective and
competition that recognizes the presence of market failures produces a far more hospita-
ble approach to intrabrand restraints and other nonstandard contracts. See Meese, Price
Theory, supra note 5, at 170 n.328; see also Goldberg, Relational Perspective, supra note 150, at
111 (noting that a manufacturer's experimentation with various vertical restraints involves
"the competitive process in producing competitive results").
155 See BORK, supra note 7, at 290-91; Goldberg, Relational Perspective, supra note 150, at
110-11; Meese, Vertical Restraints, supra note 114, at 189-95.
156 See Meese, Quick Look, supra note 59, at 487 n.109.
157 At common law, dealers were bound to whatever agreement they signed, regardless
of whether they were subjectively aware of the terms. See Sanger v. Dun, 3 N.W. 388, 389
(Wis. 1879) ("It will not do for a man to enter into a contract, and, when called upon to
abide by its conditions, say that he did not read it when he signed it, or did not know what
it contained."); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 70 (1932) (articulating the "duty to
read" approach to contract interpretation). Under such a background rule, a manufac-
turer could simply create individualized service and promotional obligations by requiring
each dealer to sign a slightly different contract. More recently, however, courts have held
that, absent subjective assent, parties are bound only by those provisions of form contracts
that are within the reasonable expectations of the parties. See Weaver v. Am. Oil Co., 276
N.E. 2d 144, 148 (Ind. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981). Even
reasonable provisions of form contracts are unenforceable unless equally applicable to par-
ties similarly situated. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981). As a result,
any manufacturer who wished to impose individualized promotional obligations on dealers
would have to ensure that there is evidence of each dealers' subjective assent to the terms
of the contract. See Meese, Vertical Restraints, supra note 114, at 193-94.
158 See BORK, supra note 7, at 290-91. Bork states:
This technique [using minimum rpm or exclusive territories] is preferable
to direct payment for such effort. Direct payment may be accepted and
competed away in lower prices, again destroying the incentive of other out-
lets to provide the desired efforts. The manufacturer would have to engage
in extensive policing activities to catch such actions, and would have to ar-
gue the question of whether the efforts being made were the correct
amount.
Id.; see also Goldberg, Relational Perspective, supra note 150, at 107 (noting that "the quality
of (retailer] service is difficult to monitor"); Telser, Fair Trade I, supra note 13, at 93-95
(describing some of these enforcement costs).
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less costly methods of solving market failure. t 59 As a result, the exis-
tence of such alternatives in no way supports a presumption that in-
trabrand restraints are anticompetitive.160
These responses are not entirely satisfactory. First and foremost,
there is no obvious response to the observation that Telser's account
lacks a mechanism to ensure that dealers engage in the particular
forms of promotion desired by the manufacturer. 16 t Absent an expla-
nation of exactly how intrabrand restraints overcome free riding, one
could not definitively state that such restraints "presumptively" or
"usually" produce the benefits Telser claimed. 162 Moreover, recogni-
tion that planning in a market economy often occurs within firms
does not explain why planning should occur when the manufacturer
has decided not to take on the distribution function itself but relied
upon the market through independent dealers. Nor does it establish
that most intrabrand restraints are examples of voluntary manufac-
turer planning of dealer activities. The mere identification of a mar-
ket failure does not ipso facto establish that the state should regulate,
i.e., plan, to correct the failure. In some cases, the cure is worse than
the disease. 163 Similarly, proof that dealers will underinvest in promo-
tion does not establish the need for manufacturer planning.' 64 In-
159 See BORK, supra note 7, at 291-97 (arguing that manufacturers can easily police in-
trabrand restraints because rival dealers can readily detect cheating by fellow dealers and
report it to the manufacturer); WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 187 (arguing that intrabrand
restraints minimize policing costs associated with a franchise system of distribution);
Goldberg, Relational Perspective, supra note 150, at 111 ("[T] he franchisor who adopts more
restrictive terms probably does so because he believes those terms are more efficacious.");
Meese, Vertical Restraints, supra note 114, at 192-93 ("[It is cheaper to determine whether
a dealer has sold outside its territory or below a certain price than it is to ascertain if it has
failed to adhere to a complex set of guidelines governing various attributes of dealer
service.").
160 Cf supra note 146 and accompanying text (describing assertions by some scholars
that existence of less restrictive alternatives gives rise to a presumption that such restraints
are anticompetitive).
161 See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text (outlining this shortcoming of
Telser's approach).
162 See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text; see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp
Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 739-48 (1988) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (arguing that absence of
specific contractual service obligations undermines the claim that intrabrand restraint
overcomes market failure).
163 See Ronald H. Coase, The Regulated Industries: Discussion, 54 AM. EcoN. REv. 194, 195
(1964) [hereinafter Coase, Regulated Industries] (pointing out that economists often em-
phasize the category of "market failure" but have no category of "government failure");
Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12J.L. & EcoN. 1, 2-4 (1969)
(explaining the so-called nirvana fallacy, whereby advocates of regulation emphasize the
failure of private markets and ignore shortcomings of government intervention).
164 Economists have often recognized, for instance, that identification of a market fail-
ure does not itself establish that complete integration, and pervasive planning within a
single entity is justified. See Oliver E. Williamson, Why Law, Economics, and Organization?
(Dec. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Cornell Law Review) [hereinafter
Williamson, Unpublished Manuscript].
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deed, the economists who argue that intrabrand restraints are
generally efficient also argue that dealers' possession of local knowl-
edge counsels against vertical integration, that is, complete planning
of the distribution function. 165
Furthermore, the response to the less restrictive alternative chal-
lenge is not as strong as perceived. Initially, it is not clear that less
restrictive alternatives are always less effective than intrabrand re-
straints. While it is true that the negotiation and policing of detailed
provisions governing individual dealers' promotional duties can be
more expensive than negotiation over a resale price or the extent of
an exclusive territory, this need not always be the case. Manufacturers
who wish to impose minimum rpm or exclusive territories presumably
must generate knowledge regarding the types of promotion they wish
dealers to provide and then calculate a corresponding price or terri-
tory that they will enforce. A requirement that manufacturers instead
"bargain" with dealers over specific service obligations would add neg-
ligible cost because a manufacturer could document promotional ex-
pectations in a form contract. Contrary to the suggestion of Telser
and others, manufacturers who impose intrabrand restraints must do
more than monitor dealers' compliance with a particular price or ter-
ritorial boundary; they also must prevent dealers from circumventing
these restrictions. 166 Creation, communication, and enforcement of
specific obligations may cost no more than the communication and
enforcement of a minimum price or exclusive territory.
In sum, recognition that less restrictive alternatives may be less
effective fails to establish that intrabrand restraints are superior from
the perspective of consumers or society. Less effective alternatives
also are less restrictive of rivalry between dealers: they may produce
fewer benefits than intrabrand restraints but may also produce fewer
harms. 167 On balance, a less restrictive alternative may well advance
social welfare more than an intrabrand restraint, even if the latter is
slightly more effective. Such reasoning both underpins the assertion
that less restrictive alternatives are "protection enough" for the legiti-
mate interests of a manufacturer or joint venture and supports the
presumption that such restraints are anticompetitive.168
165 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 109-10.
166 See Goldberg, Relational Perspective, supra note 150, at 109-10 (explaining various
steps that a manufacturer can take to prevent cheating on intrabrand restraints); Klein &
Murphy, supra note 19, at 266 (explaining that dealers can circumvent minimum rpm by
providing consumers with secret discounts); cf BoRK, supra note 7, at 291 (contending that
such restraints are easy to monitor because other dealers will readily report instances of
cheating); Telser, Fair Trade I, supra note 13, at 94 (assuming that manufacturers who em-
ploy minimum rpm need only "to police violations of minimum prices").
167 See supra notes 67-68 (outlining one possible harm of intrabrand restraints).
168 See Turner, supra note 141, at 699.
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At any rate, a conclusion that intrabrand restraints advance social
welfare more than less restrictive alternatives has modest conse-
quences for antitrust doctrine. This conclusion surely rebuts any ar-
gument that intrabrand restraints are always unnecessarily restrictive
and should therefore be unlawful per se. 169 Even absent per se treat-
ment, however, courts must analyze intrabrand restraints under the
Rule of Reason, balancing the benefits and harms of the challenged
restraint on a case-by-case basis.1 70 Courts and most scholars agree
that once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, even a reasonable
restraint would fail scrutiny if a less restrictive alternative would pro-
duce the same benefits. 171 Proof that a restraint results in an exercise
of market power establishes a prima facie case for purposes of Rule of
Reason analysis. 172 Neither Telser nor his defenders have offered any
arguments precluding the consideration of less restrictive alternatives
to intrabrand restraints in this manner. 7 3
169 See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 183-89 (rejecting the argument that the pres-
ence of less restrictive alternatives justifies automatic condemnation of exclusive territo-
ries); Meese, Vertical Restraints, supra note 114, at 189-95 (explaining that the purported
existence of less restrictive alternatives does not justify a per se rule against such restraints).
But see supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (explaining that the inhospitality tradi-
tion once led courts to declare such restraints unlawful per se); SULLIVAN, supra note 125,
at 385-86 (relying in part on the existence of less restrictive alternatives as a rationale for
per se treatment of minimum rpm).
170 See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977) (suggesting
that courts should analyze vertical restraints by balancing harms against benefits); see also,
e.g., Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998) (conclud-
ing that under the Rule of Reason "the harms and benefits must be weighed against each
other in order to judge whether the challenged behavior is, on balance, reasonable") (cit-
ing 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAv: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION 1502, at 372 (1986)); Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. As-
socs., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993) (under the Rule of Reason "it remains for the
factfinder to weigh the harms and benefits of the challenged behavior"); AREEDA, supra,
1500, at 361-64 (declaring that Rule of Reason analysis calls for balancing); HOVENKAMP,
supra note 1, § 5.6c, at 257-58 (same).
171 See Law, 134 F.3d at 1019; Capital Imaging, 996 F.2d at 543; ANTITRUST GUIDELINES,
supra note 145 (stating that any attempt to justify apparently anticompetitive restraint is
subject to a less restrictive alternative test); HOVENKAMp, supra note 1, § 12.1c, at 498 (en-
dorsing application of less restrictive alternative test as part of Rule of Reason analysis of
vertical restraints).
172 See Law, 134 F.3d at 1020 (noting that proof that restraint produces prices different
from those that previously existed established prima facie case).
173 At any rate, the argument that less restrictive alternatives are often less effective
does not buttress Klein and Murphy's account. They assert that manufacturers communi-
cate their expectations regarding the types of special service they wish dealers to provide.
See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text. In one sense, the performance bond ac-
count of intrabrand restraints lends itself to the claim that less restrictive alternatives may
achieve the same objectives as exclusive territories or minimum rpm. If a manufacturer
knows which special services it desires, then presumably it can communicate that knowl-
edge to dealers. Of course, communication of an implicit obligation does not ensure the
effective enforcement of such an undertaking. Klein and Murphy are correct that private
enforcement of a dealer's obligations is often superior to reliance upon the judicial system.
However, they have made no effort to explain why intrabrand restraints are superior to
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More importantly, responses favoring less restrictive alternatives
do not aid scholars or jurists in choosing between the alternate benign
accounts of intrabrand restraints. Is it true that the mere existence of
minimum rpm will induce dealers to engage in the promotional activi-
ties anticipated and "desired" by the manufacturer? Or are such re-
straints indistinguishable from other types of performance bonds,
such as an initial franchise fee? Moreover, does minimum rpm truly
confer market power on dealers or do these restraints simply ensure
that dealers incur the costs necessary to promote the manufacturer's
product? While a more charitable approach to intrabrand restraints
has carried the day, no universal agreement exists regarding how such
restraints induce dealers prone to free ride to produce the promo-
tional services that the manufacturer desires.
II
A PROPERTY-BASED APPROACH TO INTRABRAND RESTRAINTS
Scholars who presume that intrabrand restraints are procompeti-
tive do not agree as to how such restraints overcome a failure in the
market for distributional services.1 74 Indeed, Klein and Murphy con-
tend that intrabrand restraints do not induce dealers to produce pro-
motional services any more than would an ordinary performance
bond. Telser and his followers claim that such restraints induce deal-
ers to provide promotional services but do not explain how. At the
same time, some scholars assert that intrabrand restraints are pre-
sumptively anticompetitive even when conditions require the produc-
tion of such services.1 75 This controversy suggests the need for a fresh
analysis.
This Article explores a distinct approach that avoids the pitfalls of
either benign account of intrabrand restraints. The conclusion that
intrabrand restraints are best characterized as contracts for property
rights, unrelated to any expectation that dealers will perform particu-
lar promotional services ultimately bolsters Telser's special services ac-
count against its critics.1 76
As explained below, manufacturers can avoid the excessive costs
of planning by relying upon independent dealers to distribute their
other private enforcement mechanisms. For instance, manufacturers could require deal-
ers to post actual performance bonds or to make investments in training or equipment
specific to the relationship. Although such mechanisms have costs, they may be less costly
than the creation and enforcement of intrabrand restraints such as a minimum rpm agree-
ment. At the same time, however, such mechanisms would involve no reduction in price
rivalry between dealers.
174 See supra Part I.A.
175 See supra notes 122-46 and accompanying text.
176 See YoRAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 91 (2d ed. 1997) (not-
ing that vast majority of property rights are created by contract).
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products. Manufacturers then delegate the authority over promo-
tional decisionmaking to individuals with the requisite incentives and
knowledge to make optimal promotional investments. Background
rules of property law facilitate this process by assigning independent
dealers the presumptive right to reap the fruits of their investment in
promotional activity.
Still, considering the prospect of dealer free riding, these back-
ground rules do not ensure that dealers will internalize the benefits of
their promotional activity. By adopting vertical intrabrand restraints,
manufacturers who choose to rely upon the market-independent
dealers-to distribute their goods can better define dealer property
rights. Under a property rights paradigm, parties contract solely for
the intrabrand restraint. The resulting property right consists of the
ability to exclude other dealers from potential customers, which a
dealer locates and secures through promotional efforts.1 77 The de-
lineation of a property right in customers provides an indirect means
of creating and protecting rights in information, a valuable but fleet-
ing resource. Privatizing information allows manufacturers to alter
the institutional framework to achieve two desirable goals: a decentral-
ized system for creating knowledge regarding optimal promotional
strategies, and an atmosphere where dealers possess the incentives to
pursue such strategies without fear of free-riding. Joint ventures like-
wise can rely upon members to distribute their goods and employ hor-
izontal intrabrand restraints to ensure that members internalize the
benefits of their promotional efforts.
A. The Vices of Planning
As noted earlier, both benign accounts take as a given the manu-
facturer's decision to rely upon the market to distribute its products
but fails to ask why.178 It is therefore useful to assume for the sake of
analysis that the manufacturer has taken on the task of distribution
and to ask whether such self-distribution would be an optimal strategy.
This analysis sheds light on the manufacturer's decision to rely on the
market to distribute goods in the first place and helps explain the use
of intrabrand restraints.
A firm that chooses to distribute its own goods necessarily takes
on the task of planning or directing its own promotional activities. 179
177 See id. at 3 (defining a property right over an asset as "the individual's ability, in
expected terms, to consume the good (or the services of the asset) directly or to consume
it indirectly through exchange" (emphasis omitted)).
178 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
179 See Cheung, supra note 151, at 10 (stating that a firm directs economic activity with
a "visible hand"); Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 151, at 387-89 (describing how reli-
ance on the firm to conduct economic activity involves owner's direction or planning of
employee activity).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:553
An omniscient manufacturer would thus determine the forms of pro-
motion each employee -should provide and then communicate these
expectations to its workers.'8 0 The manufacturer would also monitor
employee efforts, terminating those who did not comply with the
manufacturer's requirements.
Such intrafirm planning is analogous to that of a communist
state,' 8 ' in which an omniscient central planner determines and over-
sees the optimal activities of each manufacturer and each dealer. 8 2
In such a world, each independent dealer would function as an em-
ployee of the state and receive orders from central authorities. 8 3 In-
deed, many economists once believed that central planning was the
best way to ensure an efficient allocation of resources. 8 4 This enthu-
siasm for planning, while perplexing to modern economists, fit within
the confines of the perfect competition model. This model, of course,
was the foundation for the neoclassical price theory that dominated
economic thinking and gave rise to the inhospitality approach. 8 5 By
adopting various unrealistic assumptions-that knowledge flows freely
and costlessly between economic actors and that firms in a given in-
dustry share the same production characteristics-the model made
planning appear to be a more realistic method of allocating society's
resources.
86
180 See SULLIVAN, supra note 125, at 386, 416; Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 283-85
(describing how manufacturers communicate such expectations to dealers); Pitofsky, No-
Frills Case, supra note 9, at 1493 (arguing that manufacturers who desire particular promo-
tional services can contract with dealers to provide those services).
181 See Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 151, at 389 & n.3 (contending that planning
that occurs within the firm is in principle no different from that undertaken in a commu-
nist state).
182 See, e.g., Oskar Lange, On the Economic Theory of Socialism: Part II, 4 REV. ECON. STUD.
123 (1937); Oskar Lange, On the Economic Theory of Socialism: Part 1, 4 REv. ECON. STUD. 53,
60-66 (1936).
183 Cf R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 Am. ECON. REv. 713, 715
(1992) [hereinafter Coase, Institutional Structure] (reporting Lenin's assertion that, in a
communist state, the state would run the economic system as one large factory); Coase,
Nature of the Firm, supra note 151, at 394 (noting that a useful theory of the firm must
explain why a single firm does not conduct all economic activity).
184 See, e.g., FRANK M. MACHOVEC, PERFECT COMPETITION AND T14E TRANSFORMATION OF
ECONOMICS 52-95 (1995).
185 See id. (explaining the link between the perfect competition model and the enthusi-
asm for planning among economists in the first half of the twentieth century); R.H. Coase,
The Nature of the Firm: Origin, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 3, 8 (1988) (chronicling the perfect
competition model and some economists' enthusiasm for central planning); see also HAYEK,
The Meaning of Competition, in ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 34, at 94-96 (explaining that
then-contemporary economists often adopted unrealistic assumptions associated with the
perfect competition model when analyzing economic problems); supra note 37 and accom-
panying text (describing role of price theory in creating inhospitality tradition).
186 See MACHOvEC, supra note 184, at 52-95; Langlois, Transaction Costs, supra note 34,
at 2 ("In this kingdom of [the world imagined by price theory], knowledge remains explicit
and freely transmittable, and cognitive limits seldom if ever constrain.").
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The real world departs in several respects from that imagined by
price theory and past devotees of central planning. Knowledge is
costly to acquire. An effective planner would have to gather a vast
amount of information about consumer preferences in each relevant
region to determine their receptivity to various possible promotional
strategies. Further, information about existing customers would not
suffice; the planner also must acquire knowledge about potential or
"marginal" customers, who would be the most sensitive to promo-
tional activities. 18 7 Even if the planner could gather this information
at no cost, he could not adequately determine the appropriate forms
of promotion. Such a determination would require the planner to
understand the capabilities and costs of each dealer and tailor promo-
tion plans accordingly. While price theorists once assumed that firms
share the same production technologies and the same cost structure,
in reality no two retailers are alike: each has unique production,
human, and reputational capacities.18 8
Of course, the central planner could avoid many of these costs by
gathering and relying upon aggregate data regarding consumers and
dealers. Specifically, a planner could adopt promotional guidelines
reflecting preferences of the average consumer and dealer. However,
this one-size-fits-all approach makes sense only if all consumers and
dealers share the same characteristics.1 8 9 In actuality, however, the
"average" or aggregate characteristics of retailers and consumers mask
wide underlying variations. 190 Thus, a one-size-fits-all approach would
ensure an improper mix of promotional efforts by every nonaverage
187 See Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Simple Theory of Advertising as a Good or
Bad, 108 Q.J. EcoN. 941, 955 (1993) (noting that advertising raises demand by attracting
marginal consumers who did not previously purchase the brand); Klein & Murphy, supra
note 19, at 284-85 (contending that manufacturers sometimes direct promotional efforts
toward marginal customers who are sensitive to such promotion).
188 See HAYEK, The Meaning of Competition, in ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 34, at 101-02
(stating "[t]hat in conditions of real life the position even of any two producers is hardly
ever the same" because "[a]t any given moment the equipment of a particular firm is al-
ways largely determined by historical accident, and the problem is that it should make the
best use of the given equipment (including the acquired capacities of the members of its
staff)" rather than "what it should do if it were given unlimited time to adjust itself to
constant conditions"); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 Am. ECON. Rsv. 519,
523 (1945) ("How easy it is for an inefficient manager to dissipate the differentials on
which profitability rests.., and that it is possible.., to produce with a great variety of costs
are among commonplaces of business experience which do not seem to be equally familiar
in the study of the economist."); see also Langlois, Transaction Costs, supra note 34, at 2-4
(explaining how neoclassical price theory rested on the assumption that the market con-
tained "identical idealized" firms possessing identical production technologies); cf CARL
KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYsIs 9
(1959) (assuming that "large permanent differences in economic efficiency among firms
... are either nonexistent or rare").
189 See supra note 188 and accompanying text (explaining that price theory incorrectly
assumed that all firms in a particular industry share the same production function).
190 See Hayek, supra note 188, at 524.
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dealer or every average dealer serving nonaverage consumers. It may
even defeat the purpose of relying upon dealers who possess knowl-
edge about local conditions.19 A planner who hoped to achieve opti-
mal results would want to determine the nature of these differences
and account for them when selecting the promotion each dealer
should undertake.1 92
This account of the shortcomings of central planning illuminates
similar problems with a manufacturer's efforts to plan employees' pro-
motional activities. Because the manufacturer-owners hold a residual
claim, a property right, to the fruits of the firm's efforts, they have
more incentive than state planners to "get things right," particularly in
a competitive market.193  Nonetheless, manufacturer-owners would
not engage in promotion themselves but would depend on their em-
ployees to do so. Although the employees have access to localized
knowledge, they lack incentive to properly gather and exploit such
knowledge.' 94 Because of the absence of employee property rights, a
manufacturer who desired optimal results would have to direct em-
ployees' promotional activities. 195 Of course, a vertically integrated
manufacturer could employ incentive-based compensation mecha-
nisms instead of simple wage contracts. As a result, employees would
pursue the owners' interests more vigorously. 196 Still, optimal promo-
191 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 110 (suggesting that automobile manufacturers
rely upon independent dealers to distribute their products because dealers possess infor-
mation about local conditions not readily available to manufacturers).
192 See Hayek, supra note 188, at 524 (stating that the kind of knowledge which is neces-
sary for central planning is "the kind which by its nature cannot enter into statistics and
therefore cannot be conveyed to any central authority in statistical form."). According to
Hayek, "[t]he statistics which such a central authority would have to use would have to be
arrived at precisely by abstracting from minor differences between the things, by lumping
together, as resources of one kind, items which differ as regards location, quality, and
other particulars .... ." Id. Thus, "from this .. .central planning based on statistical
information by its nature cannot take direct account of these circumstances of time and
place," and therefore the "central planner will have to find some way or other in which the
decisions depending on them can be left to 'the man on the spot.'
193 See generally N. SCOTr ARNOLD, THE PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS OF MARKET SOCIAL-
ism: A CRITICAL STUDY 165-233 (1994) (offering an analysis of central planning's shortcom-
ings); Louis De Alessi, Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and the X-Efficiency: An Essay in
Economic Theory, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 64, 68 (1983) (noting that the difference between a
private and a centrally owned firm is that in the latter, ownership is nontransferable); G.
Warren Nutter, Markets Without Property: A Grand Illusion, in THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS 217, 222-23 (Eirik G. Furubotn & Svetozar Pejovich eds., 1974) (offering an analy-
sis of central planning's shortcomings).
194 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 161 (arguing that transferring activity from the
market to a firm dampens incentives to innovate because employees do not realize the full
benefits of their efforts).
195 Cf Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. EcoN. REv. 777, 782-83 (1972) [hereinafter Alchian & Demsetz, Eco-
nomic Organization] (stating that private firms empower residual claimants to direct eco-
nomic activity so as to ensure that the decisionmaker possesses appropriate incentives).
196 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 146-47.
[Vol. 89:553
20041 PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INTRABRAND RESTRAINTS 591
tional decisions would result only if the employees received the entire
residual product attributable to their efforts, thereby rendering them
"owners" of the products in question. The best way to achieve this
result is to sell the products in question to dealers, who would thereby
internalize the complete benefits of their own efforts. These owners
still would have to inform themselves about the preferences of actual
and potential consumers as well as employees' capacities. The owner
then would have to process the information and determine the pro-
motional duties of each employee-dealer, just as a state central plan-
ner would.
At the same time, the manufacturer must respond to constant
changes in the variables described above. 197 Entry or other initiatives
by competing manufacturers or dealers may alter or reveal consumer
tastes.198 Marginal consumers may switch products, exposing a new
set of consumers who have different preferences and who may be sus-
ceptible to different promotional strategies. In addition, entry by
competing manufacturers may reveal new and more effective promo-
tional strategies. 199 Employees, individually and collectively, may ac-
quire new capabilities. Finally, individual regions could experience an
influx or oufflux of consumers, and exogenous factors, such as
changes in the media market, may alter the costs of various forms of
promotion.
While a firm's owners could depend upon the employee-dealers
to acquire and report relevant information about promotional op-
tions, so could a central planner.20 0 Indeed, like the planner, who
could impose legal obligations on its citizen-employees to gather and
report such knowledge, a firm could impose similar contractual obli-
gations on its employees. 20 1 Nonetheless, the imposition of these obli-
gations would simply create another problem: the need to monitor
compliance with them. Such monitoring would not be possible with-
out some method of gathering information about employee perform-
197 See HAYEK, The Meaning of Competition, in ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 34, at 101
("[A]lI economic problems are created by unforeseen changes which require adapta-
tion."); Hayek, supra note 188, at 524 ("[T]he economic problem of society is mainly one
of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time and place.").
198 See MACHOVEC, supra note 184, at 123-38 (examining the role of entry in changing
or revealing consumer preferences).
199 See id. at 107-22 (discussing how free entry and competition induce firms con-
stantly to improve their production processes).
200 See Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 183, at 715 (recounting dictum by Lenin
that the whole Russian economy "would be run as one big factory").
201 See Scott E. Masten, A Legal Basis for the Firm, 4J.L. ECON. & ORG. 181, 186 (1988)
(explaining that employees are legally obligated to convey material information to
employers).
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ance. A firm could rely on other employees to assist in the
monitoring. But, then, who would monitor the monitors?20 2
Similar shortcomings would likely beset a manufacturer's attempt
to engage in vertical planning of the promotional decisions of its inde-
pendent dealers as envisioned by the two benign approaches de-
scribed earlier.20 3  Vertical planning would replace one form
contract-the firm-with a dealership arrangement. 20 4  As the
residual claimant of the firm's activities, the owner would have an in-
centive to "get things right."20 5 On the other hand, this owner would
lack the knowledge that local dealers possess. Vertical planning would
require the owner to gather, process, and disseminate the same knowl-
edge as a central planner. While theoretically possible when the cost
of generating such knowledge is negligible, attempts to plan dealers'
promotional activities in this manner usually involve significant costs.
The same difficulties would beset a joint venture's effort to plan the
promotional efforts of members who distribute its products.
B. The Property Alternative
Given the high costs of planning, be it by government or by a
private manufacturer, how else might society allocate resources so as
to maximize welfare? More precisely, how might society generate and
utilize knowledge in a manner that maximizes society's return from
existing resources? 20 6 The conventional answer is to establish a price
mechanism. 20 7 This system allows for the decentralized production
and utilization of information by the person "on the spot," that is, the
individual most likely to possess the knowledge that society wishes to
consider when making allocational decisions. 20 8 Indeed, for some,
202 SeeJUVENAL, SATIRES VI, at 347-48 ("SED QUIS CUSTODIET IPSOS CUSTODES?" or "But
who would guard the guardians themselves?"); Alchian & Demsetz, Economic Organization,
supra note 195, at 782.
203 See supra Part I.A.
204 See Cheung, supra note 151, at 5 (stating that the firm is one type of contract);
Masten, supra note 201, at 183-94 (explaining that the firm is simply a standard set of
default obligations enforced by the state).
205 See Alchian & Demsetz, Economic Organization, supra note 195, at 782-83.
206 See F.A. HAYEK, Competition as Discovery Procedure, in NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY,
POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS (1978) [hereinafter HAYEK, NEW STUDIES];
HAYEK, The Meaning of Competition, in ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 34, at 95 (stating that a
society that hopes to maximize its welfare must determine "what institutional arrangements
are necessary in order that the unknown persons who have knowledge specially suited to a
particular task are most likely to be attracted to that task").
207 See Hayek, supra note 188, at 525-26.
208 See id. at 524-25 (declaring that the price system ensures that society utilizes infor-
mation held by "the man on the spot").
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the market-i.e., reliance on the price mechanism-is the antithesis
of planning. 20 9
Still, an injunction to rely upon the price system is a bit vague. A
price system depends upon a variety of institutions, most notably pri-
vate property and contract. 2 10 By creating and enforcing rights and
allowing individuals to trade or alter them, the state creates an institu-
tional framework that makes the price system-the market-possi-
ble. 2 11 In so doing, the state avoids the need to allocate society's
divisible property and labor on a daily basis. 212
In a system in which property rights are well specified, individual
owners who decide how to direct their labor and resources do so cog-
nizant of the costs and benefits of their actions. 213 Individual direc-
tion often entails cooperation with others, who consent to the use of
209 See Cheung, supra note 151, at 10 (remarking that the use of the firm entails reli-
ance upon the "visible hand" of planning in contrast with the "invisible hand" of the mar-
ket); Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 151, at 389-92 (contrasting the firm and the
market, and equating the former with planning and the latter with "reliance on the price
mechanism").
210 See BARZEL, supra note 176, at 11-13 (explaining that the price-theoretic perfect
competition model depends upon perfect specification of property rights and costless
transactions); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, Free Enterprise and Competitive Order, in ECONOMIC INDIVID-
UALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 110-11 (1948) ("That a functioning market presupposes not
only prevention of violence and fraud but the protection of certain rights, such as prop-
erty, and the enforcement of contracts, is always taken for granted."); Coase, Institutional
Structure, supra note 183, at 717-18 ("[T]he rights which individuals possess, with their
duties and privileges, will be, to a large extent, what the law determines. As a result, the
legal system will have a profound effect on the working of the economic system and may in
certain respects be said to control it."); Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of
Property Rights, 7 J.L. & ECON. 11, 18 (1964) [hereinafter Demsetz, Exchange and Enforce-
ment] ("The institution of private property.., is probably due in part to its great practical-
ity in revealing the social values upon which to base solutions to scarcity problems.");
Nutter, supra note 193, at 220-24.
211 See Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 183, at 718 ("[Legal] rights should be
assigned to those who can use them most productively and with incentives ... to discover
(and maintain) such a distribution of rights .... [T]he costs of their transference should
be low, through clarity in the law and by making the legal requirements for such transfers
less onerous."); see also Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, 33J.
ECON. HIST. 16, 20-22 (1973) [hereinafter Alchian & Demsetz, Property Right Paradigm]
(arguing that the utility of property rights depends upon the deregulation of prices and
elimination of other restraints on alienation).
212 See Alchian & Demsetz, Property Right Paradigm, supra note 211, at 18-20 (contrast-
ing incentive effects of private and communal rights).
213 See id. at 19-20 (explaining that absence of property rights causes individuals to
ignore the full costs and benefits of their actions); De Alessi, supra note 193, at 66 ("If
transaction costs are zero, then these rights will be fully defined, fully allocated, and fully
enforced. Moreover, they will be reallocated to their highest-valued use regardless of their
initial assignment." (citing R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. ECON. 1 (1960))
(footnote omitted)); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
347, 350 (1967) [hereinafter Demsetz, Property Rights] (explaining how well-defined prop-
erty rights can cause property holders to internalize social costs and benefits of their
actions).
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their own property and labor.214 This cooperation often requires con-
tractual modification of state-created rights or the creation of new
rights. 2 15 For instance, a trademark owner has the right to exclude
rivals from using the trademark, even if these rivals can show that
their products are virtually identical to those of the owner. 216 How-
ever, the owner may relinquish certain rights by contract, at once li-
censing the mark to innumerable business partners and placing strict
controls on each licensee's activities. 217 In this way, the owner rede-
fines the right to expand access to its product while retaining control
over the mark and its associated image.
Property owners do not have perfect knowledge about the various
possible uses of their property. Nonetheless, in a system that recog-
nizes private property and allows parties to part with such property for
a price, there is no need for any individual to possess more than a
fraction of the knowledge necessary to order economic activity. 218
Consider the example of a landowner attempting to decide how to
dispose of some farmland. Under a system of central planning, the
state would decide how to use that property and how consumers
would value each potential use. The state's planner would determine
the nature of the soil, local weather conditions, and what crops or
livestock the land could support. The planner would also ascertain
what inputs (e.g., fertilizer, pesticides, machinery, labor, and water)
are necessary for each possible use as well as the capabilities of poten-
tial tenants. With this knowledge, the planner could assign value to
various crops or livestock, net the cost of each input, and determine
the most valuable use of the land.21 9 If, by contrast, land is private
214 See BARZEL, supra note 176, at 33-54 (analyzing different contractual forms that
parties employ to redefine property rights and facilitate cooperation).
215 See id. at 14 ("[C]ontracts that use the state's assistance to delineate and reassign
ownership are central to the property rights approach."); id. at 33 ("At the heart of the
study of property rights lies the study of contracts. Contracts, whether formal or informal,
reallocate rights among contracting parties."); Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 183,
at 718 (discussing how background rules can maximize value of production if they allow
parties to transfer and redefine property and other rights); see also GARY D. LIBECAP, CON-
TRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 29-30 (1989) (explaining how California miners created
and enforced property rights in gold-rich land nominally owned by the national
government).
216 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20(1)(b) (1995).
217 This is the definition of business format franchising. See Kabir C. Sen, The Use of
Initial Fees and Royalties in Business-format Franchising, 14 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 175
(1993) (explaining this form of franchising); see also Rubin, supra note 96, at 224-25
(same).
218 See Hayek, supra note 188, at 525-26 (explaining that in a market system, "[t]he
whole [of the system] acts as one market, not because any of its members survey the whole
field, but because their limited individual fields of vision sufficiently overlap so that
through many intermediaries the relevant information is communicated to all").
219 Similarly, a government that "owned" the airwaves could decide who gets to broad-
cast on which frequency, based on a prediction regarding what the person would broad-
cast, how much it would cost, and whether the broadcast would maximize the welfare of
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property and subject to alienation, the property owner-who has
every incentive to maximize the land's sale price-would have to
make one simple and straightforward determination: who is willing to
pay the most for the property. 220
The fact that the landowner in our example does not obtain or
use certain information does not imply that no one does. Someone
has to decide how much to offer the owner for his land, and the
owner presumably will choose from many competing offers. Thus, a
farmer desiring to grow beans on the land has to determine the cost
of cultivation and the value of the beans produced. A rancher who
proposes to raise cattle needs to make a similar determination. In
composing their bids, each potential owner has the incentives neces-
sary to make a bid reflecting the best assessment of the land's value for
a particular use. Each individual relies upon localized and idiosyn-
cratic knowledge of personal capabilities as well as the costs and (net)
benefits of utilizing the property. This knowledge exceeds the practi-
cal reach of a central planner.22'
In short, even the free market and the system of private property
that supports it require the generation and dissemination of a vast
amount of knowledge. Still, a property system essentially delegates
this task to myriad individual actors, each with the incentive to maxi-
mize property value and each reacting upon signals that other prop-
erty owners produce.222 The result is a decentralized market system
for producing, disseminating, and using knowledge, a system that out-
performs central planning.2 23
C. Property Rights and Intrabrand Restraints
Again, both benign accounts of intrabrand restraints begin with
the assumption that a manufacturer has decided to rely upon the mar-
ket-i.e., dealers-to distribute its goods. 22 4 The comparison of cen-
tral planning and a price system supported by property rights
listeners, netting the production costs of the broadcasts. See R.H. Coase, The Federal Com-
munications Commission, 2J.L. & EcoN. 1, 5-7 (1959).
220 See Hayek, supra note 188, at 526; see also Demsetz, Exchange and Enforcement, supra
note 210, at 17 (discussing crucial link between property and the price system's allocative
function).
221 See Hayek, supra note 188, at 524-25 ("We need decentralization because only thus
can we ensure that the knowledge of the particular circumstance of time and place will be
promptly used.").
222 See id. at 524-28.
223 See HAYEK, NEW STUDIES, supra note 206, at 232-46 (arguing that planning is infer-
ior to market alternatives); Nutter, supra note 193, at 220-24 (explaining how a decentral-
ized economy is superior to central planning); cf Hayek, supra note 188, at 527-28
(contending that no one has devised a workable alternative to the price system for allocat-
ing resources in a society premised on the division of labor).
224 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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illuminates both a manufacturer's decision to rely upon dealers and
the rationale for intrabrand restraints. If property rights and reliance
on the price mechanism offer an antidote to the shortcomings of cen-
tral planning, then perhaps property rights are superior to a regime in
which manufacturers plan the activities of employees through explicit
expectations regarding promotional activities. 225 By creating property
rights and allocating them among independent dealers, a society dele-
gates the task of deciding how to exploit the property. At the same
time, society ensures that the individuals with access to the knowledge
necessary to make sound promotional decisions will have the incen-
tives to gather and employ that knowledge.
Positive law creates such a system of property rights. Absent a
collateral agreement, dealers and others who purchase products from
a manufacturer possess title and control over those products. 226 With
control, dealers are free to exclude potential customers from their
products unless consumers pay an agreed price. Under positive law,
manufacturers who do not wish to plan the promotional activities of
employee-dealers may opt for a regime of property rights under which
dealers decide how, where, to whom, and at what price to promote
the product.227 As true owners of the product-that is, as claimants to
the item's residual value-dealers have incentive to maximize the net
benefits from product sales, thus acting as perfect agents of the manu-
facturer. 228 Dealers who choose the right mix of promotional activi-
ties will "capture" the most customers and realize the highest
prices. 229 Put another way, dealers will "keep what they kill." 2 - 0 In
contrast, employees of a vertically integrated manufacturer without
such property rights possess imperfect incentives to acquire the knowl-
edge necessary to engage in appropriate forms of promotion.23 1
225 See supra Part II.A (describing this option and its various potential shortcomings).
226 See U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (2002) (defining "sale" of a good as involving "passing of title
from the seller to the buyer for a price"); id. § 2-403 (explaining that a "purchaser of goods
acquires all title which his transferor had").
227 See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 377-78 (1967) (discuss-
ing common law's hostility to restraints on alienation of personal property).
228 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (stating that an agent
will faithfully pursue a principal's interests if the agent internalizes the full costs and bene-
fits of his actions).
229 See SULLIVAN, supra note 125, at 414-15 (arguing that market rivalry between deal-
ers will produce correct investments in promotion).
230 Cf Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (establishing the rule of
capture).
2-31 See Williamson, Unpublished Manuscript, supra note 164, at 14-15 (describing vari-
ous shortcomings of complete integration, including low powered incentives, administra-
tive controls, and relative inability to adapt to change); see also BARZEL, supra note 176, at
8-9, 52-53 (suggesting that efficiency requires parties to allocate property rights to individ-
uals whose efforts will have the largest impact on the property's value).
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Similar considerations are said to explain a firm's decision to rely
upon a franchising system. For example, an entrepreneur with an
idea for a new restaurant chain could open hundreds of restaurants,
owning each restaurant himself and employing everyone who works
there. Employee-managers would make the day-to-day operating deci-
sions at each restaurant. Those employees with access to information
about the tastes and preferences of local consumers would not inter-
nalize the revenue (or costs) of the operation they supervise. Entre-
preneurs adopting a franchise system, on the other hand, ensure that
the operator of each independent franchise restaurant internalizes a
large share of the costs and benefits of activities. 232 By relying upon
independent dealers, a manufacturer can harness the same high-pow-
ered incentives produced by the market and thus avoid the shortcom-
ings inherent in a system of complete integration or other methods of
planning dealer promotional activities. 2 33 A joint venture can realize
similar benefits by declining to distribute its output and instead rely-
ing upon its members. 234 Each approach reflects economists' predic-
tion that parties will allocate property rights to those most able to
affect the property's value.23 5
Decentralization is not an end in itself; it is useful only to the
extent that it leaves market participants with appropriate incentives to
produce valuable social goods. 2 36 Economists once assumed that the
market automatically produced an optimal allocation of resources, ig-
noring the prospect of opportunism and the cost of producing and
transferring information. 23 7 However, reliance on the market often
comes at a cost-what economists now refer to as a "transaction
cost. '23 8 A market based upon a rule of capture may leave dealers
with imperfect property rights, attenuating the benefits of a decentral-
ized system for identifying promotional strategies. Take, for instance,
232 See Brickley, supra note 96, at 748 (contending that franchising serves this
purpose).
233 See Cheung, supra note 151, at 10-13 (explaining how piece rate and market sys-
tems "clearly reveal[ ] productivity differentials among workers" and thus eliminate the
need for extensive monitoring); Williamson, Unpublished Manuscript, supra note 164, at
14-15 (describing various shortcomings of complete integration, including low-powered
incentives, administrative controls, and relative inability to adapt to change).
234 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (evaluating re-
straint ancillary to venture where members distributed the venture's product).
235 See BARZEL, supra note 176, at 8-9, 52-53, 78.
236 See Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 183, at 718 (opining that a well-function-
ing economic system requires that "rights should be assigned to those who can use them
most productively and with incentives that lead them to do so" (emphasis added)). See generally
Demsetz, Property Rights, supra note 213, at 356-58 (stating that decentralized land holdings
may result in externalities that parties can sometimes control by contract).
237 See supra note 135 and accompanying text (explaining the tendency of price theo-
rists to assume away opportunism and information costs).
238 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 20-22; Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 151, at
390-91
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the case of an automobile manufacturer who sells cars to all approved
dealers without any contractual restraints on dealer prices or territo-
ries. A rule of capture would ensure that each dealer keeps whichever
customer the dealer convinces to purchase a car. The problems with
such a rule should be clear, in light of the prospect of dealer opportu-
nism that Professor Tesler identified.239 That is, the efforts of one
dealer may lead to the "capture" of a customer by a different dealer.
A consumer could take advantage of a dealer who advertises a particu-
lar automobile, spends significant time explaining the car's attributes,
and allows the consumer to test drive it, by purchasing the vehicle
from a "cut-rate" dealer across the street who provides few, if any, pro-
motional services. 240
Of course, the rule of capture does not prevent a full-service
dealer from selling automobiles. Having provided the consumer with
the requisite product information, the dealer can match or undercut
the price charged by the cut-rate dealer. Indeed, this is a rational
strategy in the short run, insofar as the cost of advertising and demon-
strating the car is sunk and does not enter into the dealer's calculus
when determining the car's sale price. 24' However, such a strategy
ultimately would leave the dealer with a loss. More importantly, when
deciding whether to promote a different car in the future, the puta-
tive full-service dealer must account for the possibility that it will not
be able to realize a price sufficient to cover the costs of the automo-
bile and its promotion. As a result, information regarding the attrib-
utes of the product remains a collective good: once produced,
recipients may consume the good without paying for it.2 4 2 The result
will be less promotion and fewer customers.243 Similar problems beset
the rule of capture in other contexts in which property rights are
poorly delineated. 244
239 See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
240 See Telser, Fair Trade I, supra note 13, at 91-92.
241 See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAw 187-90 (1991) (explaining how production of information can be a sunk
cost in the context of an auction bidder's search for an undervalued takeover target).
242 See OLSON, supra note 42, at 14-15 (defining collective good).
243 SeeTelser, Fair Trade I, supra note 13, at 91; see also, e.g., Isaksen v. Vt. Castings, Inc.,
825 F.2d 1158, 1161-62 (7th Cir. 1987) (reporting one dealer's letter to manufacturer
stating that "[t]he worst disappointment is spending a great deal of time with a customer
only to lose him . . .because of price. This letter was precipitated by the loss of [three]
sales of V.C. stoves today [to] people who[m] we educated [and] spent long hours with."
(second and third alterations in original)).
244 See Pierson v Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 178-81 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (Livingston,J., dissent-
ing). Judge Livingston chided the majority for granting a property right to a hunter who
captured a fox that a different hunter had identified:
Hence it follows, that our decision should have in view the greatest possible
encouragement to the destruction of an animal, so cunning and ruthless in
his career. But who would keep a pack of hounds; or what gentleman, at
the sound of the horn, and at peep of day, would mount his steed, and for
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Therefore, given the fact that promotional information is a col-
lective good, it seems that reliance upon the price system buttressed
by property rights entails significant transaction costs. Knowing that
promotional investments are vulnerable to opportunistic free riding,
dealers have no incentive to discover optimal promotional strategies.
Consequently, reliance on a market-based system of distribution
would not generate the sort of localized knowledge that could facili-
tate distribution of the manufacturer's product. Similar problems
would beset a joint venture's reliance on individual members to dis-
tribute its product.245
Nonetheless, goods are not collective or private in the abstract.
Their status is a function of property rights.2 46 By altering the back-
ground structure of property rights, the state can render private what
might otherwise be a public or collective good.24 7 Moreover, not all
property rights derive from positive law; some derive from private con-
tract, which actors use to rearrange rights the law has granted.2 48 No
system of law precisely defines and enforces every property right that
society might usefully employ. Thus, society allows individuals to cre-
ate or redefine property rights by contract.249 By rearranging these
hours together, 'sub jove fiigido,' or a vertical sun, pursue the windings of
this wily quadruped, if, just as night came on, and his strategems and
strength were nearly exhausted, a saucy intruder, who had not shared in
the honours or labours of the chase, were permitted to come in at the
death, and bear away in triumph the object of pursuit?
Id. at 181; see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 241, at 172-74 (arguing that the rule
of capture for corporate takeovers undermines incentives for bidders to seek out underval-
ued companies and results in suboptimal investment in the production of information);
Dhammika Dharmapala & Rohan Pitchford, An Economic Analysis of "Riding to Hounds":
Pierson v. Post Revisited, 18J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 39 (2002) (arguing that the rule of capture
announced in Pierson resulted in underinvestment in foxhunting).
245 See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1040 (N.D. Ill.
1970) (finding that joint venture's reliance on unrestrained members to distribute its
product would result in suboptimal promotion), rev'd on other grounds, 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
246 See Coase, The Lighthouse, supra note 29, at 357, 359-60 (contending that a good's
status as public or private depends upon the background definition and assignment of
property rights); see also Alchian & Demsetz, Property Right Paradigm, supra note 211, at
22-25 (describing a system of property rights that can transform a communal good charac-
terized by underproduction into a private good).
247 See Coase, The Lighthouse, supra note 29, at 372-76.
248 See BARZEL, supra note 176, at 14.
249 See Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 183, at 717-18 (arguing that the institu-
tional framework should minimize the cost of redefining and transferring rights to employ
social resources); cf FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, Socialist Calculation I.- The Nature and History of the
Problem, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 135 (1948) ("The recognition of the prin-
ciple of private property does not by any means necessarily imply that the particular delimi-
tation of the contents of this right as determined by the existing laws are the most
appropriate.").
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rights, private actors can alter the institutional structure of production
and affect the ultimate allocation of resources. 250
A classic example of a contractually created property right is the
covenant ancillary to the sale of a business. According to positive law,
the seller has every right to compete with the purchaser immediately
after the transaction of a sale. In other words, purchasers-no more
than sellers-have no state-created right to particular customers for
the goods or services they provide. 251
The absence of state-created rights does not reflect a social deter-
mination that such rights are useless or counterproductive. Instead,
by declining to create such rights, the state avoids the cost of deter-
mining the proper scope of covenants, forcing the affected parties to
set the relevant boundaries. 252 Predictably, parties often create such
rights by contract. For instance, sellers of a business often agree not
to compete with the purchaser in a defined area for a fixed period of
time after the sale. 25 3 Courts regularly enforce such agreements, rec-
ognizing that these undertakings are necessary to create and protect
the value of the business and the associated goodwill that the seller
created. 254 Although the restrictions reduce competitive rivalry, they
250 See Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 183, at 716 (explaining that the pres-
ence or absence of transaction costs will affect the ultimate allocation of resources and that
market actors can alter these costs by adopting contractual provisions and other practices);
Williamson, Unpublished Manuscript, supra note 164, at 26 (distinguishing institutional
environment, or "rules of the game," created by the state, from the institutions of govern-
ance, or "play of the game," which parties can alter by contract).
251 For instance, there is no common law tort of competition. See generally RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. a (1995) ("The freedom to compete neces-
sarily contemplates the probability of harm to the commercial relations of other
participants in the market .... The freedom to compete implies a right to induce prospec-
tive customers to do business with the actor rather than with the actor's competitors.").
But see MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE COMMON LAW OF RESTRAINT OF TRADE: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 234-35 (1986) (discussing precedents from the British Common-
wealth holding that sellers may not specifically solicit former customers but may nonethe-
less serve them in the ordinary course of business).
252 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic The-
ory of Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87, 119-27 (1989) (addressing default rules that penalize
both parties for not memoralizing their understanding, thus forcing the parties to bargain
explicitly for what they "would have wanted").
253 See, e.g., Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 13 N.E. 419, 423 (N.Y. 1887) (enforcing
covenant by seller not to compete with purchaser in most of the United States for ninety-
nine years); see also United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280-82 (6th Cir.
1898) (examining the common law governing such restraints).
254 See, e.g., Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 280 ("It was of importance, as an incentive to indus-
try and honest dealing in trade, that, after a man had built up a business with an extensive
good will, he should be able to sell his business and good will to the best advantage," but
"he could not do so unless he could bind himself by an enforceable contract not to engage
in the same business in such a way as to prevent injury to that which he was about to sell.");
Diamond Match Co., 13 N.E. at 421-22 ("It is an encouragement to industry and to enter-
prise in building up a trade, that a man shall be allowed to sell the good-will of the business
and the fruits of his industry upon the best terms he can obtain.").
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also protect incentives to create and sell businesses in the first
place. 2 55 Thus, these contracts help construct the "free market" and
affect the allocation of resources within it.256 On similar grounds,
courts occasionally hold that the covenant of good faith implied in all
contracts protects dealers' expectations to serve particular areas unaf-
fected by rivalry from the manufacturer or newly appointed dealers. 257
Similarly, a manufacturer who chooses to rely upon "the market"
to distribute its goods need not content itself with the atomistic pro-
cess implied by the rule of capture. "The market" is not an exogenous
or natural entity entirely distinct from the firms or individuals employ-
ing it. To the contrary, the market can entail any number of institu-
tional arrangements. 2 58  Although positive law grants dealers a
presumptive right to full dominion and control over products they
purchase, the parties can alter these rights by contract, creating what
appear to be new rights. For instance, a manufacturer might decide
to condition the sale of its product on dealers' agreements not to do
business with certain customers. It could do so expressly by reserving
certain customers for itself or for other dealers. 259 Or it could do so
indirectly by limiting the dealers' locations or obtaining an agreement
from dealers not to sell purchased products outside a certain defined
area. 260 Finally, the manufacturer could set a price below which deal-
ers could not charge and enforce the price floor against price cut-
255 See Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689 (1978) ("The
long-run benefit of enhancing the marketability of the business itself-and thereby provid-
ing incentives to develop such an enterprise-outweighed the temporary and limited loss
of competition."); see also TREBILCOCK, supra note 251, at 252 ("A restrictive covenant en-
ables the owner of a business in effect to capitalize the benefits of expected returns from
investments in goodwill ... by creating limited property rights in these assets in the pur-
chaser that protects him from reappropriation of those assets by the vendor."); id. at
258-67 (arguing that enforcement of such restrictions generally serves the public interest).
256 See generally Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 183, at 717-18 (discussing how
market outcomes and the resulting allocation of resources largely depend upon back-
ground legal rules).
257 See Vylene Enters. v. Naugles, Inc., 90 F.3d 1472, 1477 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
implied covenant of good faith prevented franchisor from awarding new franchise in close
proximity to franchisee); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 727-28 (7th Cir.
1979) (finding that implied covenant of good faith prevented franchisor from opening
several company-owned stores near franchisee's location); Scheck v. Burger King Corp.,
798 F. Supp. 692, 699-700 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (recognizing that the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing prevents the franchisor from destroying the franchisee's right to enjoy the
benefits of the contract).
258 Cheung, supra note 151, at 19 (noting that there are various contractual arrange-
ments between "the firm" and "the market"); Coase, Meaning of Firm, supra note 152, at 19
(same).
259 See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 256 (1963) (evaluating
arrangement reserving certain customers for the manufacturer while granting dealers ex-
clusive territories).
260 See, e.g., Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (passing upon
arrangement limiting locations from which franchisee could distribute manufacturer's
product).
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ters.26 1 Similar logic also explains horizontal intrabrand restraints, as
when a joint venture imposes such restraints on members who dis-
tribute its products. 262
Vertical intrabrand restraints create and define new property
rights, especially the property right to exploit customers that a dealer
or other distributor has "found." By redefining property rights, manu-
facturers can reduce the cost of relying upon the market and, ironi-
cally, more closely replicate the results produced by the "perfect"
market that economists once took for granted. 263 One method-the
reservation of customers-does so expressly. Exclusive territories and
location clauses, for example, rely upon the realities of time and space
to increase the probability that dealers will receive the patronage of
the customers they convince to purchase the manufacturer's product.
A price floor ensures that dealers who produce information useful to
consumers do not lose the customers to dealers who refuse to incur
the cost of promotion. Just as a mandatory price ceiling would pre-
vent dealers from recouping their investments in ancillary goods and
services, unbridled rivalry would drive prices so low that dealers could
not recoup their investments in information. 264 A price floor protects
these investments by attenuating such rivalry, perfecting dealers' in-
centives to identify and pursue optimal promotional strategies. Simi-
larly, horizontal restraints can grant property rights to members of a
joint venture who distribute the venture's product.265 A few scholars
have suggested such a characterization of these restraints, without de-
veloping its implications. 266
261 See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 765-68 (1984) (finding
that evidence supported jury's verdict that defendant maintained minimum resale prices).
262 See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (evaluating horizontal
territorial restraints ancillary to a joint venture); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350
(1967) (same).
263 See COASE, supra note 33, at 67-68 (arguing that nonstandard contracts and other
practices are often "a necessary element in bringing about a competitive situation"); WIL-
LIAMSON, supra note 7, at 27 (suggesting that nonstandard contracts can be used to rede-
fine property rights to ensure that the "residual rights to control [are] placed in the hands
of those who can use [the] rights most productively"); see also BARZEL, supra note 176, at
11-13 (explaining that price theory's model of perfect competition, which assumed away
information and bargaining costs, rested on assumption that property rights are perfectly
specified).
264 See BARZEL, supra note 176, at 28-29 (explaining that price ceilings on gasoline
prevented dealers from charging gasoline prices that covered the cost of related services
such as service attendants).
265 See, e.g., Topco, 405 U.S. at 600-06.
266 Professor Williamson previously suggested that "nonstandard" contracts are means
of "[r]edescribing property rights" to place control over assets "in the hands of those who
can use those rights most productively." WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 27. He does not,
however, mention the property rights approach in connection with intrabrand restraints.
Indeed, in prior work, he indicated that intrabrand restraints can accompany obligations
to provide particular collateral services, including advertising. See, e.g., Williamson, Vertical
Market Restrictions, supra note 108, at 976. Moreover, Judge Bork suggested that minimum
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None of these mechanisms results in perfect specification of
property rights in consumers or, more importantly, information. A
dealer restricted to a single location can nonetheless sell to any cus-
tomer who shows up there. 267 Moreover, a price floor cannot prevent
consumers from purchasing from free-riding dealers; it can only make
them indifferent about doing so. Finally, dealers can circumvent a
price floor by, for instance, bundling discounted items with the main
product.
2 68
Still, imperfection is no argument against a property rights inter-
pretation of intrabrand restraints. In the real world, no property right
is perfectly specified; that is, each definition leaves some room for op-
portunistic exploitation by others.2 69 Moreover, as explained below,
manufacturers can take various steps to minimize exploitative behav-
ior.2 70 An imperfect property right is often better than no property
right, and manufacturers presumably choose among various imperfect
rpm may be seen as the equivalent of a contractual property right. Responding to a claim
that promotional information does not constitute "output" for the purpose of social wel-
fare calculus, Bork noted that "[c]ontract law delegates to private persons the power to
create property rights because of their superior knowledge of the efficiencies to be gained
in particular situations. R[pm] is best viewed as an instance of this general principle."
Robert H. Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare, 77 YALE L.J. 950, 956 (1968).
Bork did not elaborate on this suggestion but instead returned to his argument that pro-
motion is a form of socially useful output. See id. at 956-58. Bork's subsequent writings on
the subject do not repeat the property rights characterization or otherwise shed light on
the debate between Telser et al., on the one hand, and Klein and Murphy, on the other.
See, e.g., BORK, supra note 7, at 280-98, 449-50, 453-54; Robert H. Bork, Schwinn Overruled,
1977 Sup. CT. REv. 171, 180-82 (analyzing the economics of vertical intrabrand restraints
without referring to property rights); see also Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines
Co., 792 F.2d 210, 217-23 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.) (examining economic impact of
horizontal intrabrand restraints without invoking concept of property rights). Finally, in
an introduction to an article on exclusive dealing, Professor Marvel suggests that minimum
rpm may be viewed as a property right held by dealers. See Howard P. Marvel, Exclusive
Dealing, 25J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1982). Marvel does not, however, examine the basis for the
creation and enforcement of such a right, choosing instead to examine the rationale of
exclusive dealing, which he characterizes as a means of granting a property right to a man-
ufacturer. See id. Indeed, Marvel suggests that manufacturers grant exclusive territories to
"selected full service dealers," a conclusion that seems somewhat inconsistent with the ar-
gument made in this Article. See id. at 10.
267 See, e.g., Murrow Furniture Galleries, Inc. v. Thomasville Furniture Indus., Inc., 889
F.2d 524, 525 (4th Cir. 1989) (evaluating manuf-:cturer policy preventing dealers from
advertising outside the state and selling to customers not physically present in the store).
268 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
269 See BARZEL, supra note 176, at 11 ("Because of the costliness of delineating and
policing rights, opportunities arise for some people to capture what appears to be others'
wealth."); id. at 92-93 (employing "free" salt provided by restaurants as an example of an
imperfectly specified property right which could result in overconsumption by customers);
Demsetz, Exchange and Enforcement, supra note 210, at 14-15 (using parking spaces as an
example of such imperfectly specified rights).
270 See infra notes 340-43 and accompanying text (outlining various means that manu-
facturers may employ to minimize dealer attempts to cheat on such restraints).
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mechanisms. 27 1 By defining and enforcing property rights, manufac-
turers transform the information produced by those who distribute
their products from a collective good into a good that is largely private
in nature, ensuring that someone internalizes the benefits of its pro-
duction.27 2 Because they internalize these benefits and the costs of
promotion, dealers can act as faithful agents of the manufacturer,
identifying and producing the type and amount of promotion the
manufacturer would desire. 273
Once in possession of a property right, a dealer would determine
how best to exploit the right in question, given the dealer's unique
knowledge, capabilities, and assessment of local consumers' prefer-
ences.2 74 One automobile dealer might rely heavily on print advertis-
ing. Another might emphasize the recruitment and retention of
highly trained sales people. A third might invest in a courteous and
efficient service department, hoping that consumers' experience with
the department would encourage them to return to the dealer when
they purchase a new vehicle.2 75 A fourth might seek an equal balance
of all three methods. In an economy and society as varied as ours,
each dealer would likely choose to produce a slightly different mix of
promotional information, confident of reaping the rewards of such
investments. 276 A dealer's choice would not be set in stone, as the
localized knowledge driving the decisions would be in constant
271 See BARZEL, supra note 176, at 92-96 (explaining that parties often maximize their
welfare by creating imperfectly defined rights, given the high cost of enforcing rights that
are perfectly defined).
272 See Coase, The Lighthouse, supra note 29, at 359-60 (explaining that a good's status
as public or private depends upon the background definition and assignment of property
rights); I. Trotter Hardy, Not So Different: Tangible, Intangible, Digital, and Analog Works and
Their Comparison for Copyright Purposes, 26 U. DAYrON L. REv. 211, 220-22 (2001) (contend-
ing that a good's status as private or public depends upon existence or not of property
rights in it). See also Easterbrook, Vertical Arranagements, supra note 60, at 150 n.30 ("Re-
stricted dealing may be a beneficial response to the high cost of conveying (and establish-
ing property rights in) information.").
273 SeeJensen & Meckling, supra note 228, at 308 (stating that agent who internalizes
the costs and benefits of actions will faithfully pursue owner's interests); see also Bork, Rule
of Reason, supra note 57, at 436 (contending, without elaboration, that exclusive territories
can create "an identity of interest" between the manufacturer and its dealers).
274 See Meese, Vertical Restraints, supra note 114, at 193 (pointing out that exclusive
territories allow dealers to customize promotion for different customer bases).
275 See Kevin J. Arquit, Resale Price Maintenance: Consumers' Friend or Foe?, 60 ANTITRUST
L.J. 447, 453 (1992) (explaining that minimum rpm can induce dealers to supply postsale
services).
276 One scholar sympathetic to Telser's analysis has noted that manufacturers might
prefer different promotional strategies in, for example, rural areas than in cities. See
Goldberg, Relational Perspective, supra note 150, at 110-11 n.84. Like Klein and Murphy,
however, Goldberg assumes that manufacturers would "combine vertical restrictions with
enforcement to elicit various forms of intensive retailing effort from their dealers." Id. at
110.
[Vol. 89:553604
2004] PROPERTY RIGHTS AND INTRABRAND RESTRAINTS 605
flux. 277 Reliance on a market system of distribution allows for more
rapid and nuanced responses to these changes and lowers distribution
costS.
2 7 8
Intrabrand restraints, then, may alter the institutional framework
within which dealers conduct business. 2 79 The restraints redefine
dealer property rights in a manner that minimizes the transaction
costs associated with relying upon a market system of distribution. 2 80
However, these restraints need not be part of a manufacturer's efforts
to plan the promotional activities of its dealers, as the two benign ap-
proaches apparently assume. 28 1 As explained earlier, such planning
would be extremely expensive because a manufacturer could not
gather the knowledge required to announce and enforce promotional
obligations unique to each particular dealer. 28 2 Thus, such restraints
facilitate the manufacturer's decision to reject such planning in favor of
a market-based system of distribution, with its high-powered incentives
and reliance on local knowledge. In the same way, horizontal in-
trabrand restraints can facilitate ajoint venture's decision to rely upon
its members to sell the venture's output. Within such a property
rights regime, each dealer or venture member could decide individu-
ally how much to invest in promotion, what sort of promotion to em-
ploy, and how to respond to any changes in relevant variables.
To be sure, a single manufacturer or joint venture that is verti-
cally integrated into distribution also possesses a property right in any
information produced about its products. As a nominal matter, such
a firm would be the "single owner" of the information it produced.2 3
Those who embrace a price-theoretic approach to industrial organiza-
277 See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text (explaining that data relevant to
promotional decisions are constantly changing).
278 See Hayek, supra note 188, at 524-25 (showing that reliance upon decentralized
price mechanism to allocate resources empowers individuals with localized knowledge to
adapt rapidly to changed circumstances); see also Cheung, supra note 151, at 13-15 (illus-
trating how reliance on the market to allocate resources entails less direction by those
negotiating the sale of goods or services).
279 See Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 183, at 716 (explaining that many busi-
ness practices are designed to lower the cost of relying upon the market to conduct eco-
nomic activity).
280 See BARZEL, supra note 176, at 11 ("Exchange partners may impose restrictions on
one another in order to reduce the level of undesired behavior. Consequently, property
rights-particularly the right to consume what appears to be one's own property-are
often made subject to [contractual] constraint."); id. at 14 (explaining that many property
rights are defined by contract).
281 See supra notes 104-21 and accompanying text (explaining how approaches offered
by Professors Telser, Klein, and Murphy all rest on assumption that manufacturers plan or
expect particular promotional services from their dealers).
282 See supra notes 187-205 and accompanying text.
283 See Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to
Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 555-57 (1993) (contending that the sole owner of a
resource will employ the resource in a manner that maximizes social value).
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tion assume that this sole owner would adopt optimal promotional
strategies. 28 4 Yet, contrary to the assumptions of price theory, the
"firm" is not a "black box," whose employees automatically pursue the
owners' interests. 28 5 In the modern manufacturing corporation or
joint venture, residual claimants who internalize benefits will be far
removed from the local context in which promotional decisions are
best made. Individuals "on the spot," however, will be employees, and
thus lack the high-powered incentives that independent entrepre-
neurs possess.286 By adopting intrabrand restraints and relying upon
the market to distribute goods, the manufacturer or joint venture has
the best of both worlds: decentralized decisionmaking by individuals
with access to local knowledge and appropriate incentives to provide
effective promotion. 28 7
Such restraints naturally reduce competition, but so do other
property rights, whether created by the state or contract. The law of
trademark, for instance, assigns a seller an exclusive right to sell prod-
ucts under its brand, thus eliminating competition with others who
might try to sell under the same mark without the owner's consent. 288
Contracts ancillary to the sale of a business eliminate competition be-
tween the seller and purchaser. 28 9 Nonetheless, courts enforce such
284 See Carstensen, supra note 8, at 608-09 (contending that complete vertical integra-
tion would insure that the manufacturer internalized benefits of promotion and thus over-
come free rider problem); see also supra note 33 and accompanying text (noting price-
theoretic assumption that firms always pursued unitary interests).
285 See MACHOvC, supra note 184, at 16 (describing the firm of price theory as a
roboticized calculating machine); Langlois, Contract, supra note 33, at 837 ("Since the
[price-theoretic] firm is a single, indivisible unit, the traditional theory describing the
'classical' firm ignores the firm's internal contractual makeup."). One scholar argues that
manufacturers or joint ventures could solve market failures by "internalizing the activity
within the organization." See Carstensen, supra note 8, at 608. Such "internalization"-that
is, complete vertical integration-is supposedly superior to reliance upon intrabrand re-
straints, which require "discretionary adherence to a contract in the face of obvious eco-
nomic temptation." Id. Like price theorists, Carstensen assumes that the various
participants in individual firms pursue complete unitary interests-i.e., that the interests of
employees and owners never diverge. Absent this unrealistic assumption, the claim that
complete vertical integration will always be superior to intrabrand restraints does not sur-
vive scrutiny.
286 See Cheung, supra note 151, at 10, 13-15 (discussing how unlike wage contracts,
piece work arrangements, which closely approximate market contracting, directly reward
productivity differences between laborers); Williamson, Unpublished Manuscript, supra
note 164, at 14-15 (explaining that employees lack the high-intensity incentives possessed
by entrepreneurs and equating "the firm" with the existence of an employment relation-
ship) .
287 See Bork, Rule of Reason, supra note 57, at 468 (arguing that areas of primary respon-
sibility are less effective than exclusive territories because the former would require the
manufacturer to centrally gather and process information regarding the optimal promo-
tional activities of each dealer); Meese, Vertical Restraints, supra note 114, at 193 (suggesting
that vertical restraints can facilitate decentralization of promotional decisions).
288 See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
289 See supra notes 253-55 and accompanying text.
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restraints, so long as they are "reasonable," because they facilitate the
creation of property in the first place. 290
III
IMPLICATIONS
Most scholars believe that intrabrand restraints are presumptively
beneficial and generally embrace Telser's theory that intrabrand re-
straints may prevent dealers or others who distribute products from
free riding on each others' promotional efforts. 29 1 Nonetheless, some
scholars still cling to the inhospitality tradition, rejecting Telser's
claim that intrabrand restraints usually reduce distribution costs and
promote social welfare. 292 At the same time, Klein and Murphy ques-
tion Telser's account of intrabrand restraints and offer their own "per-
formance bond" theory of such arrangements. 293 Finally, while courts
presume that some intrabrand restraints are beneficial, others are au-
tomatically or presumptively unlawful. 294 The property rights ap-
proach of intrabrand restraints explored here ultimately bolster's
Telser's account against both sets of critiques. A property account
also compels rejection of antitrust doctrines, left over from the inhos-
pitality tradition, that are hostile to such restraints.
A. Response to Critics of the Special Services Argument
The property rights approach to intrabrand restraints offers a
more robust response to several critiques of Telser's account and un-
dermines any lingering manifestations of the inhospitality tradition.
For instance, consider the claim that intrabrand restraints constitute
inappropriate manufacturer administration of dealers' promotional
decisions. 29 5 Telser's articulation of the special services rationale for
intrabrand restraints would seem to rest upon a claim that manufac-
turers know what types of promotional services dealers should pro-
duce, the prices they should charge, or the locations where they
290 See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1979) (stat-
ing that courts should be reluctant to condemn restraints that are reasonably necessary to
further intellectual property rights); see also Fred S. McChesney, Antitrust and Property (In-
cluding Intellectual): First Principles, 2000 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 23, 25-27 (same).
291 See supra notes 8-9; see also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
292 See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text (describing origins of inhospitality
tradition).
293 See Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 274-76.
294 See, e.g., Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1977) ("Vertical
restrictions promote intrabrand competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve cer-
tain efficiencies in the distribution of products. These 'redeeming virtues' are implicit in
every decision sustaining vertical restrictions under the rule of reason."); supra note 62
(collecting authorities holding that intrabrand restraint on price as output are unlawful
per se or presumptively so).
295 See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
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should sell their products. 2 9 6 Similarly, Klein and Murphy's perform-
ance bond argument depends on the contention that manufacturers
determine what sorts of services dealers should provide and then ter-
minate those dealers who do not provide them.297 By contrast, a
property rights approach to intrabrand restraints rejects any assump-
tion that manufacturers plan or administer dealer activities. Indeed,
the whole point of a property rights approach is that manufacturers
understand that they are incapable of administering dealers' promo-
tional decisions.
It may well be true that dealers are in a better position than man-
ufacturers to determine what sorts of promotion to produce given
their access to localized knowledge about the costs and benefits of
various forms of promotion. Yet, by creating and defining property
rights, intrabrand restraints avoid the pitfalls of centralized decision-
making while harnessing the benefits of decentralization. A contrary
approach relying on the rule of capture would undermine the enter-
prise of decentralization by distorting the incentives faced by dealers
who seek to determine (independently) how to promote the product
they have purchased. 298
Viewed as a property right, intrabrand restraints are the antithe-
sis of manufacturer planning. Property rights eliminate certain forms
of rivalry between dealers. For instance, an exclusive territory pre-
vents a dealer outside the territory from securing customers from an-
other dealer's territory. Such a restraint affects a dealer's decisions
about where to compete with other dealers of the same brand. How-
ever, this attribute does not distinguish intrabrand restraints from
other forms of property, whether created by the state or by contract.
All property prevents some individuals from enjoying the fruits of
others' efforts. That is the purpose of property.299 The alternative-a
war of all against all for whatever resources individuals can capture-
would replicate the tragedy of the commons throughout society.300
Market-based competition requires property, including property that
296 See supra notes 108-21 and accompanying text.
297 See Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 267-68.
298 See supra notes 225-41 and accompanying text.
299 See BARZEL, supra note 176, at 10-11 (remarking that where property rights are
imperfectly specified, some individuals will be able to capture the fruits of others' efforts);
Demsetz, Property Rights, supra note 213, at 348-53 (contending that society recognizes
property rights when such rights are necessary to ensure that individuals reap the rewards
of their own efforts, as against the depredations of interlopers).
300 See Alchian & Demsetz, Property Right Paradigm, supra note 211, at 19-20 (explaining
shortcomings of communal ownership system); see also N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193
U.S. 197, 411 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting):
I am happy to know that only a minority of my brethren adopt an interpre-
tation of the law which in my opinion would make eternal the belum
omnium contra omnes and disintegrate society so far as it could into individ-
ual atoms. If that were [Congress'] intent I should regard calling such a law
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parties create by contract.301 Courts have long recognized that con-
tracts are not suspect merely because they eliminate rivalry that would
otherwise have occurred. 30 2 Recognition of property, including prop-
erty created by contract, does not constitute improper administration
in any economically meaningful sense.
A property rights interpretation of intrabrand restraints also ac-
counts for the absence of explicit or implicit obligations that in-
trabrand restraints merely support. As explained earlier, some
scholars and jurists consider the absence of explicit or implicit obliga-
tions damning to a manufacturer's claim that intrabrand restraints en-
hance the efficiency of its distribution system. 30 3  This critique
emphasizes the failure of Telser and others to articulate how in-
trabrand restraints induce dealers to engage in the promotional activi-
ties that the manufacturer desires. 30 4 The absence of an explanation
may suggest that intrabrand restraints do not produce the benefits
that Telser attributes to them.3 0 5 Far from suggesting anything nefari-
ous, however, the lack of explicit obligations is entirely consistent with
a regulation of commerce as a mere pretense. It would be an attempt to
reconstruct society.
301 See COASE, supra note 33, at 8-9 (explaining that commodity exchanges, often in-
voked as exemplars of perfect competition, are in fact the result of complex contracts that
restrain the discretion of numerous actors); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust,
63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 1 (1984) (same); see also HAYEK, Free Enterprise and Competitive Order, in
ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 34, at 110-11 (noting that the competitive market presup-
poses background rules of property, contract, and tort); HAYEK, NEW STUDIES, supra note
206, at 190 (stating that protection of private property and "the whole aggregate of liberta-
rian institutions of law" are necessary to support a price system).
302 See, e.g., Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-88 (1978)
(enforcement of commercial contracts, including covenants not to compete, "enables com-
petitive markets-indeed, a competitive economy-to function effectively"); Bd. of Trade
of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (Brandeis, J.) (
[T]he legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by.
whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every
regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely
regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such
as may suppress or even destroy competition.
); Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements, supra note 60, at 156 ("Every restricted deal-
ing arrangement is designed to influence price. It must be .... Every argument about
restricted dealing implies that the restrictions influence price. There is no such thing as a
free lunch; the manufacturer can't get the dealer to do more without increasing the
dealer's margin.").
303 See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text; see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp
Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 739-42 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that in-
trabrand restraint must be "ancillary" to some express obligation to provide promotional
services to avoid per se condemnation); Carstensen, supra note 8, at 591 (contending that
"the freerider explanation for overt restraints on resale competition implies the existence
of some prior commitment, overt or tacit, by the reseller to provide some costly service or
effort in connection with the sale").
304 See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
305 See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
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a property rights conception of these restraints. After all, a property
right aims to facilitate delegation of economic authority to the firm or
the individual with the best access to the knowledge necessary to make
the decision.30 6 Delegation avoids the need for detailed prescription
of dealers' promotional duties, thereby ensuring that dealers pursue
promotional strategies that further the manufacturer's interest. In-
deed, the imposition of such precise obligations, by contract or other-
wise, is the antithesis of the sort of property right posited here. 30 7
Omission of explicit or implicit obligations collateral to an intrabrand
restraint says nothing about the social value of such restraints.
A property rights conception of intrabrand restraints also under-
mines the claim that less restrictive alternatives are valid substitutes for
such arrangements. If, for instance, manufacturers could simply bar-
gain with dealers and negotiate precise promotional obligations, 0s
the bargaining, policing, and enforcement of such obligations would
be costly-perhaps more costly than implementing a resale price or
exclusive territory.30 9 Even if bargaining and enforcement cost noth-
ing, this alternative would be inferior to the contractual specification
of a property right. After all, the whole point of a property right is
that the manufacturer does not know what sorts of information or how
much information dealers should produce. Without this knowledge,
a manufacturer cannot bargain with dealers over their promotional
obligations. As a result, a requirement that manufacturers further
their interests by imposing discrete promotional obligations on deal-
ers would rest upon a mischaracterization of the (legitimate) interests
that the restraints serve. 310 In other words, explicit bargaining over
306 See discussion supra Part II.B.
307 The Supreme Court seems to have been moving in this direction in Business Elec-
tronics Corp. There, the dissent argued that the lack of promotional obligations undertaken
by dealers required a conclusion that an agreement to terminate a price cutter was not
collateral to a legitimate purpose and thus was a "naked" restraint of trade in per se viola-
tion of the Sherman Act. See Bus. Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. at 739-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The majority responded by noting that a restraint could be "ancillary" to a transaction of
sale despite the absence of any other contractual obligations. See id. at 729-30 n.3. The
majority also argued that a requirement that manufacturers adopt explicit obligations to
avoid per se treatment was perverse and that such restraints may be "inefficient" when
compared with "efficient nonprice vertical restraints." See id. Unfortunately, the Court did
not explain how such a restraint could be "efficient" without some mechanism ensuring
that the remaining dealer performs the promotional services the manufacturer desires.
This Article supplies the argumentation missing from the Court's opinion and recognizes
that an agreement such as that challenged in Business Electronics Corp. could effectively as-
sign property rights to the remaining dealer.
308 See supra note 143 and accompanying text; Pitofsky, Dr. Miles, supra note 8, at 29.
309 See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
310 See Meese, Vertical Restraints, supra note 114, at 193 (concluding that exclusive terri-
tory is superior to manufacturer imposition of a particular service obligation because the
former approach allows for "dealer-by-dealer decision making about the appropriate mix
of various presale and postsale services").
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dealers' precise promotional obligations cannot further the interest
advanced by contractual property rights: creation of a decentralized
process for producing and acting upon knowledge regarding optimal
promotional investments. Those who rely on such bargaining incor-
rectly assume the existence of the very knowledge that intrabrand re-
straints are designed to produce.31 a Similar considerations also apply
to other purported contractual alternatives.
3 12
Moreover, complete integration is a poor substitute for contractu-
ally created property rights, as it eliminates many advantages of rely-
ing upon the market to distribute products. 3 13 By owning dealerships
and planning the activities of individuals who work there, a manufac-
turer forfeits the benefits of relying upon independent dealers with
strong incentives to develop promotional strategies that serve the in-
terests of both parties.3 14 By defining and conferring property rights
311 See HAYEK, The Meaning of Competition, in ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 34, at 92-99
(contending that price-theoretic economists assumed the widespread existence of knowl-
edge and other conditions without asking how these conditions came about).
312 For instance, so-called "areas of primary responsibility" allow dealers to operate
wherever they wish so long as they make "best efforts" within the territory assigned to them.
See Turner, supra note 141, at 699. Even if bargaining over such a provision were costless,
the agreement cannot advance the same interest as the exclusive territory, for two indepen-
dent reasons. First, because such an approach leaves other dealers free to sell wherever
they wish, a dealer will have no assurance of recapturing the benefits of promotional invest-
ments made in its area of primary responsibility. See Meese, Quick Look, supra note 59, at
487 n.109. Second, a contractual requirement that dealers make their "best efforts" within
their areas of responsibility does not serve the same interest-decentralization-as a con-
tractual property right. Someone still has to determine whether a dealer has made best
efforts. No manufacturer or court can make such a determination without performing the
same function that contractual property rights delegate to dealers.
Nearly four decades ago, then-Professor Bork discussed a similar response to the claim
that areas of primary responsibility will produce the same efficiencies as an exclusive terri-
tory. As Bork noted, this alternative would require the manufacturer to constantly super-
vise and evaluate the promotional activities of each dealer-a task he considered
prohibitively expensive in light of dealers' superior access to information. See Bork, Rule of
Reason, supra note 57, at 468. Although Bork's argument implicitly rested upon the sort of
"property rights" logic that this Article applies, he did not employ the term or seek to
generalize the concept as a rationale for reliance upon the market or use of intrabrand
restraints. Indeed, Bork treated the promotion produced by completely integrated firms
as a perfect baseline for evaluating the promotional efforts of firms that rely upon the
market. See, e.g., id. at 434-35. This assumption precludes the possibility that reliance on
the market is a superior method of distribution. Moreover, Bork did not use this reasoning
to respond to the planning assumptions inherent in Telser's work or Klein and Murphy's
subsequent work. Bork did suggest in passing that vertical restraints could be character-
ized as contracts for property rights in a subsequent article. See supra note 265. However,
he did not elaborate on this suggestion, see id., and the author is unaware of any subse-
quent work that expands on Bork's suggestion.
313 But see Coase, Nature of the Firm, supra note 151, at 394 (explaining that reliance on
the firm to conduct economic activity comes with independent costs that may impel firms
to rely upon markets instead).
314 See Williamson, Unpublished Manuscript, supra note 164, at 14-15 (explaining that,
by transforming independent contractors into employees, complete integration dampens
employee incentives and creates opportunities for shirking not present in the market-
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on independent dealers, however, intrabrand restraints help manufac-
turers realize the best of both worlds: independent dealers willing and
able to behave in an entrepreneurial fashion and appropriate incen-
tives to ensure that these dealers internalize the full benefits of their
activities. 315 At any rate, a firm is itself a nexus of (voluntary) con-
tracts, and complete integration does not magically transform inde-
pendent dealers into automatons who singlemindedly pursue the
owner's will. Thus, complete integration will not insure the optimal
production of promotion. 316
In sum, a property rights account of intrabrand restraints ex-
plains how such contracts induce dealers or other firms to identify
and execute promotional strategies that further the interest of a single
manufacturer or joint venture in generating demand for its product.
At the same time, a property rights approach rebuts any claim that less
restrictive alternatives can serve the same objectives. These conclu-
sions have significant implications for antitrust policy. For example,
they rebut the theoretical claim that such restraints are presumptively
anticompetitive. 317 As a result, the property rights account compels
the rejection of all existing per se rules against vertical or horizontal
intrabrand restraints, and thus requires the Supreme Court to repudi-
ate various precedents associated with the inhospitality tradition. 31 8
That is to say, a property rights approach requires that courts analyze
all intrabrand restraints under the Rule of Reason currently reserved
only for some restraints. 319
A property rights account has other important implications for
such a Rule of Reason analysis. This account weakens any claim that
certain intrabrand restraints are so often anticompetitive that their
place); see also id. at 21 (arguing that "added bureaucratic costs accrue upon taking a trans-
action out of the market and organizing it internally [with the result that] internal
organization is usefully thought of as the organization form of last resort").
315 One scholar suggests that intrabrand restraints are less effective than complete in-
tegration because they are susceptible of cheating and difficult to enforce. See Carstensen,
supra note 8, at 606-08. As a result, he concludes that intrabrand restraints are most likely
anticompetitive attempts to exercise or create market power. See id. at 608-09. If such
restraints are difficult to enforce, however, it is not clear how they can be anticompetitive
in any significant way.
316 See supra notes 193-202 and accompanying text.
317 See supra text accompanying note 146.
318 In particular, application of a property rights account would require the Court to
overrule Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Servs., 465 U.S. 752, 761 n.7 (1984) (adhering to per se
rnle against minimum rpm); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-57
(1982) (declaring maximum horizontal price fixing ancillary to a legitimate joint venture
unlawful per se); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (holding hori-
zontal allocation of territories ancillary to legitimate joint venture per se unlawful); and
United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 356-57 (1967) (finding horizontal minimum price
fixing ancillary to legitimate joint venture unlawful per se).
319 See supra text accompanying notes 61-62 (explaining that courts analyze some in-
trabrand restraints under the Rule of Reason and treat others as unlawful per se).
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mere existence should suffice to establish a prima facie case. 3 2°1 Al-
though an intrabrand restraint may in some instances be anticompeti-
tive, proof that parties entered into such an agreement is equally
consistent with a procompetitive interpretation and thus cannot give
rise to a presumption against it.321
A property rights account also undermines the need to analyze
such alternatives on a case-by-case basis whenever a plaintiff makes out
a prima facie case and offers a less restrictive alternative. 3 22 After all,
case-by-case analysis rests on the assumption that these alternatives
sometimes produce the same or similar benefits as the intrabrand re-
straint under challenge. 323 However, such alternatives can never pro-
duce one benefit of such restraints: the delegation of decisionmaking
power to the person "on the spot."3 2 4 Therefore, if a manufacturer
can show that an intrabrand restraint functions as a contractually cre-
ated property right, Rule of Reason analysis should end regardless of
whether the plaintiff can formulate a less restrictive alternative.
B. Bolstering the Telser Approach Against the Klein and
Murphy Account
A property rights account of intrabrand restraints bolsters
Telser's original argument against objections that Klein and Murphy
advance. Telser did not explain how an intrabrand restraint can en-
320 For precedents taking such an approach in Rule of Reason litigation, see Cal. Den-
tal Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769-70 (1999) (stating that mere existence of horizontal
restraint on price or output suffices to establish a prima facie case); Nat'l Collegiate Ath-
letic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 110 n.40 (1984) (same); ANri-
TRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 145 (agency will presume agreement lawful "where the
likelihood of... harm is evident from the nature of the agreement."). Interestingly, one
court of appeals has already applied a lenient Rule of Reason analysis to horizontal in-
trabrand restraints, rejecting an automatic presumption that such restraints are anticompe-
titive whenever they invoke price or output. See Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. Nat'l
Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593, 600-01 (7th Cir. 1996) (determining that a lenient Rule of
Reason applies when the restraint accompanies substantial integration between the par-
ties). But see HovENKAi.NP, supra note 1, § 4.7, at 189 (describing the Seventh Circuit's deci-
sion as "controversial").
321 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992)
("Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market reali-
ties are generally disfavored in antitrust law."); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-95 (1986) (noting that evidence consistent with both procompeti-
tive and anticompetitive objectives cannot alone support an inference of anticompetitive
conduct); Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. at 761-64 (same); First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv.
Co., 391 U.S. 253, 280 (1968) ("[T]he inference that Cities' failure to deal was the product
of factors other than conspiracy [is] at least equal to the inference that it was due to con-
spiracy, thus negating the probative force of the evidence showing such a failure.").
322 See supra note 171 and accompanying text (explaining that, under current law, a
plaintiff will prevail by showing that the defendant could have achieved his objectives via a
less restrictive means of competition).
323 See id.
324 See Hayek, supra note 188, at 524.
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sure that dealers produce the exact promotional services the manufac-
turer desires. 325 Klein and Murphy emphasized this omission and
questioned whether intrabrand restraints can induce dealers to en-
gage in such promotion. 326 Absent an explanation from Telser, Klein
and Murphy surmised a different role for intrabrand restraints: per-
formance bonds. 327 The property rights account of intrabrand re-
straints responds to the Klein and Murphy challenge.
A property rights perspective illuminates a manufacturer's deci-
sion to rely upon the market to distribute its products. Like price
theorists, however, Telser, Klein, and Murphy ignore this question
and begin with the unexplained assumption that the manufacturer
exogenously chooses to rely upon the market.328 By failing to con-
sider the rationale for this decision, these scholars have obscured the
justification for intrabrand restraints. 329 I do not mean to suggest that
Professors Telser, Klein and Murphy embrace all of the postulates of
price theory. On the contrary, these scholars have offered creative
approaches that depart in numerous ways from the price-theoretic
framework. Both accounts, for instance, depend upon the assump-
tion that dealers are prone to opportunism and that manufacturers
cannot control this behavior with explicit contracting. 330 Nonethe-
less, these scholars have retained at least one habit of price theory: the
assumption that the boundaries of the firm, here the manufacturer,
are a given, determined by considerations exogenous to the rationale
for intrabrand restraints. As a result, this Article suggests that these
scholars have overlooked a powerful rationale for reliance on the mar-
ket and intrabrand restraints: decentralization.
A property rights perspective explains why manufacturers choose
to rely upon the market in the first place. This explanation also re-
buts the claim that intrabrand restraints cannot induce the exact pro-
motional services the manufacturer desires. 331 By relying upon the
market, manufacturers consciously leave the decision regarding pro-
motional investments to independent dealers, who have a compara-
tive advantage in acquiring the knowledge necessary to make
325 See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
326 See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
327 See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
328 See supra notes 70, 101 and accompanying text.
329 Cf THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 114-17 (1962)
(explaining how relaxation of background assumptions can lead to new explanations for
previously observed phenomena).
330 See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text.
331 See Klein, Distribution Restrictions, supra note 19, at 7 n.11 (challenging the standard
economic analysis of how vertical restraints operate to induce desired retailer behavior by
the manufacturer); Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 265-67 (same).
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educated promotional decisions.3 3 2 More precisely, a property rights
approach suggests that reliance on the market presents two main ad-
vantages: one informational and one incentive based. By relying upon
local dealers, manufacturers can decentralize decisionmaking author-
ity to the individuals most likely to possess the knowledge necessary to
make optimal decisions regarding promotion and distribution of the
manufacturer's product.333 By relying upon independent dealers,
manufacturers simultaneously ensure that those who are "on the spot"
have high-powered incentives to seek and to use the proper promo-
tional strategy. 334 In turn, intrabrand restraints can help manufactur-
ers perfect dealer incentives and thus enhance the benefits of a
market-based, decentralized system of distribution. The lack of any
mechanisms to assure that dealers produce particular services actually
enhances the value of such property rights by ensuring that dealers
can rely upon their own local knowledge to pursue strategies that
serve the manufacturer's interest.33 5 Similar logic explains why ajoint
venture would depend on members bound by horizontal intrabrand
restraints to distribute its product.3 36
Given this account of the rationale for reliance on the market, a
property rights approach rejects the basic assumption that manufac-
turers desire or anticipate particular types or levels of promotion.
The account also rejects Klein and Murphy's claim that an implicit
contract exists between manufacturers and dealers implementing
manufacturers' expectations. Indeed, a property rights approach
posits that manufacturers deliberately choose not to determine what
sorts of promotion dealers should produce. This determination
would be too costly because it would require manufacturers to gather
unique, localized information about each dealer and its base of actual
and potential consumers. Although price theorists advocate such an
approach, it would be prohibitively expensive in reality.3 3 7 Like schol-
ars who argue that bargaining over promotional obligations is a "less
restrictive means" of furthering a manufacturer's objective, Klein and
332 See David A. Butz & Andrew N. Kleit, Are Vertical Restraints Pro- or Anticompetitive?
Lessons from Interstate Circuit, 44J.L. & ECON. 131, 145-46, 155 (2001) (arguing that in-
trabrand restraints could enhance promotional expenditures by selected retailers without
inducing promotion by others).
333 See discussion supra Part II.B.
334 See Hayek, supra note 188, at 524.
335 A property rights account explains how intrabrand restraints are "self-monitoring."
Marvel, supra note 54, at 64 (suggesting, without elaboration, that vertical intrabrand re-
straints are "self enforcing"). It also explains why manufacturers would want intrabrand
restraints to be "self-monitoring." See supra notes 193-202 and accompanying text.
336 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (collecting decisions evaluating restraints
ancillary to such ventures).
337 See supra notes 178-92 and accompanying text (discussing shortcomings of central
planning and the perfect competition model on which such planning was based).
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Murphy presume the very knowledge that intrabrand restraints are de-
signed to create. 33 8
To be sure, dealers can "cheat" on intrabrand restraints, as Klein
and Murphy claim. A dealer who avoids detection can sell outside an
assigned territory. Similarly, a dealer can circumvent minimum rpm
by engaging in nonpromotional competition by, for instance, provid-
ing disguised discounts to consumers.339 Customers aware of cheating
can consume the promotion produced by full-service dealers and ob-
tain the product at what is effectively a discounted price.
The fact that a property right is susceptible to some cheating does
not condemn the interpretation offered here. All property rights are
imperfect in this manner. The seller of a business can evade the plain
meaning of a covenant not to compete by locating just outside the
radius set by the arrangement and serving customers from within that
radius. A neighbor can avoid a fee simple by walking her dog very
early in the morning, thereby evading detection when the animal tres-
passes. Finally, a driver can park in a lot marked "for customers only"
without patronizing the store that owns the lot. While imperfect, each
of these rights serves the interests of the parties asserting them.
Property owners can also take steps to minimize cheating. The
purchaser of a business can secure a promise from the seller not to
solicit certain customers or even all customers in a certain area. The
property owner can put a fence around her yard or wake up early to
monitor potential trespassers. The merchant can charge for parking
and provide free parking to those who validate their tickets.
Manufacturers, too, can attenuate the imperfections that might
beset intrabrand restraints. 340 A firm that adopts an exclusive terri-
tory can also prevent dealers from soliciting orders from outside the
territory. 341 The firm can even require dealers to decline to serve cus-
tomers who live outside their assigned territories. 342 A manufacturer
concerned that dealers might cheat on minimum rpm by discounting
338 See HAYEK, The Meaning of Competition, in ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 34, at 92-99
(explaining how price theorists assumed existence of knowledge and other conditions
without inquiring into what type of economic system brought them about).
339 See Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 266; see also supra notes 74-75 and accompa-
nying text (explaining how bundling and other forms of nonprice competition may under-
mine minimum rpm).
340 See Marvel, supra note 54, at 64 ("[W]ith a manufacturer supervising its conduct, a
dealer will find it difficult to evade [rpm]."). Even Klein and Murphy argue that nonprice
competition between dealers will not always eliminate the premium that intrabrand re-
straints create. If it did, then intrabrand restraints could not serve as performance bonds.
See Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 278-79.
341 See Murrow Furniture Galleries, Inc. v. Thomasville Furniture Indus., Inc., 889 F.2d
524, 525 (4th Cir. 1989).
342 Cf id. at 525-29 (upholding a provision barring dealers from selling to consumers
not physically present in the store).
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related products can prohibit the dealer from selling or advertising
such products or maintain the prices of these products instead.3 43 In
addition, a manufacturer concerned that dealers might offer overly
generous warranties can assume the warranty function itself and pro-
hibit its dealers from offering more generous warranties. By adopting
these mechanisms, a manufacturer can reduce the number of alterna-
tive forms of nonprice competition available to dealers and further
perfect the property right that it grants. Moreover, manufacturers
need not always monitor compliance with such restraints, but may in-
stead rely upon dealers to complain when competing dealers cheat.
Joint ventures can take similar steps to perfect the property rights con-
ferred on members that distribute their products.
Nonetheless, the mere fact that contractual property rights allow
dealers to realize the benefits of optimal promotional strategies by re-
couping their investments in information does not mean that dealers
will make such investments. Something must spur them to do so. Ac-
cording to Klein and Murphy, dealers who are parties to intrabrand
restraints may simply choose to pocket the premium that such re-
straints create, without embarking on any promotional efforts. 344 As a
result, manufacturers must adopt some method of contractual control
to make sure that dealers invest in the production of information.34 5
The prospect of pocketing is more hypothetical than real. Deal-
ers may pocket a premium created by intrabrand restraints only if they
attract a significant number of customers who are willing to purchase
the product at the price necessary to support the premium. While
intrabrand restraints may temper intrabrand competition, they have
no effect on the rivalry between the restrained dealers and dealers
selling other brands.3 46 Interbrand competition-including actual or
potential competition from completely integrated firms-could de-
prive shirking dealers of the customers necessary to support a strategy
of passively pocketing the premium. 347 Absent cooperation between
different manufacturers and their dealers, such competition will likely
motivate dealers to exercise their contractually protected rights to
343 See OVERSTREET, supra note 103, at 84-101 (providing examples of such restric-
tions); Goldberg, Relational Perspective, supra note 150, at 109-10 (arguing that manufactur-
ers can limit cheating by prohibiting bundled sales); Marvel, supra note 54, at 65 n.l
(contending that manufacturers can impose advertising restrictions that deter cheating);
see also Ill. Corp. Travel, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d 722, 724 (7th Cir. 1986) (evalu-
ating airline's ban on travel agent's advertisement of discounts from airline's ticket prices).
344 See Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 266.
345 See supra text accompanying notes 85-94 (explaining Klein and Murphy's views on
this question).
346 See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977) (explaining
that interbrand competition is unaffected by restrictions on intrabrand competition).
347 See id. (noting that interbrand competition can discipline a dealer's exercise of
intrabrand market power).
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produce information. Dealers who do not produce such information
will likely find themselves losing customers to dealers who do.
Put differently, any claim that manufacturers can grant dealers a
premium over the price that would otherwise prevail in the market
assumes a significant number of consumers willing to pay the pre-
mium-creating price. How can dealers be sure that consumers will pay
such prices, particularly given competition from other brands? Klein
and Murphy's invocation of product differentiation is less an answer
than an unexplained assumption.
Product differentiation-actual or perceived differences between
functionally similar products-is not a preexisting, exogenous phe-
nomenon but instead the result of a process in which intrabrand re-
straints play an important role.3 48 Someone must communicate
product differences to potential consumers.349 Without this promo-
tion, consumers will have no reason to prefer the manufacturer's
product to the various products sold by the firm's competitors.3 50
Thus, Klein and Murphy's claim that dealers might pocket a premium
produced by an intrabrand restraint is circular because it assumes the
existence of the very promotional activities that intrabrand restraints
induce dealers to perform.3 5 1 Dealers who hope to create a premium
in the face of interbrand competition must engage in presale
promotion.
It should be noted that the property rights approach does not
exclude all other explanations for intrabrand restraints. As noted ear-
lier, economists and other scholars sometimes observe intrabrand re-
straints imposed by manufacturers whose products do not require
presale promotional services. 352 Such restraints could reflect attempts
by manufacturers or dealers to exercise market power, to the detri-
348 See Meese, Price Theory, supra note 5, at 166 n.487 (explaining that manufacturers
cannot create differentiated products absent some method for communicating such differ-
ences to consumers).
349 See JOHN MAURICE CLARK, COMPETITION AS A DYNAMIC PROCEss 251 (1961) ("Product
differentiation requires substantial selling effort in some form . .. ."); Williamson, Vertical
Market Restrictions, supra note 108, at 976-77 (arguing that when potential customers lack
perfect information about attributes of differentiated products, manufacturers must com-
municate the product's attributes to consumers).
350 See Williamson, Vertical Market Restrictions, supra note 108, at 976-77.
351 Cf HAYEK, The Meaning of Competition, in ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 34, at 92-99
(criticizing economists for embracing economic models that assume competitive results
without asking what sort of process is necessary to produce those results in the first place);
id. at 96 (explaining that mainstream economic models assume away the very activities,
including activities differentiating products, that constitute useful competition in the real
world).
352 See supra notes 84-100 and accompanying text; see also Marvel, supra note 54, at 80
(" [E]ven with new theories and reinterpretation of existing efficiency explanations, not all
uses of [rpm] are likely to be explicable.").
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ment of consumers and society.35 3 Such restraints may also function
as performance bonds to facilitate the enforcement of obligations un-
related to presale promotion. 354 For example, a manufacturer might
employ such restraints as part of an effort to ensure that dealers prop-
erly refrigerate a product or take other steps to ensure the product's
quality.35 5 In this way, a manufacturer could prevent dealers from in-
juring the manufacturer's reputation by providing suboptimal quality
to consumers.
35 6
The use of intrabrand restraints to protect a product's goodwill
may be part of an effort to plan certain aspects of dealers' activities.
Nevertheless, such planning differs from efforts to plan dealers' pro-
motional activities in two ways. First, almost by definition, manufac-
turers are in a better position to manage the quality of their product
than are individual dealers with no role in developing or manufactur-
ing it. Second, there is no obvious property rights alternative to cen-
tralized management of product quality. While many consumers are
repeat players who will purchase the manufacturer's product multiple
times, nothing requires them to purchase the product from the same
dealer more than a fraction of the time. 35 7 A consumer may purchase
a particular brand of beer from two or three local grocery stores, some
convenience stores, liquor stores, and restaurants. Assigning dealers a
property right by intrabrand restraint or otherwise will not induce
dealers to take the necessary steps to protect a product's quality, since
dealers with such a right still may not internalize more than a fraction
of the benefits of maintaining product quality.358 These circum-
stances may warrant some form of planning by the manufacturer of a
dealer's activities that maintain product quality.
In the end, Klein and Murphy's account of how intrabrand re-
straints induce presale promotion desired by a manufacturer or joint
venture does not withstand careful analysis. As a result, scholars and
courts attempting to discern the rationale of various intrabrand re-
straints may have to distinguish the different transaction costs that re-
liance upon the market produces. When reliance on an unrestrained
market will lead to an underinvestment in presale promotion, it seems
best to interpret these restraints as contractually created property
353 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
354 See Klein & Murphy, supra note 19, at 277-82 (arguing that manufacturers might
employ restraints in this manner).
355 See id. at 280-82 (arguing that Coors employed intrabrand restraints in an effort to
accomplish this objective).
356 Id. at 277-82; see also Brickley, supra note 96, at 748-49 (explaining that individual
franchisees may lack appropriate incentives to protect the quality of the franchise
product).
357 See Brickley, supra note 96, at 748-49.
358 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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rights, without any accompanying controls on dealers' promotional
activities. As Professor Telser claimed, intrabrand restraints induce
the optimal production of promotional services, without the sort of
planning he apparently implied. Where, on the other hand, reliance
on the market leads to dealer shirking that affects product quality, it
may make sense to interpret such restraints as performance bonds.
CONCLUSION
Manufacturers or joint ventures can avoid the costs of planning
promotional activities by relying upon the market to distribute their
goods. However, reliance on the market brings other costs as dealers
or other distributors find themselves unable to recoup their invest-
ments in promotional activities. Intrabrand restraints may help cure
this market failure by granting effective property rights over informa-
tion that dealers and others produce. Far from planning the activities
of dealers and others, intrabrand restraints facilitate the delegation of
decisionmaking to independent firms with the knowledge and incen-
tives necessary to develop and execute optimal promotional strategies.
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